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I Summary 
The research projects described in this thesis were conducted in a joint industry-university 
cooperation between the Patient Safety department of Novartis Pharma AG and the division 
of Clinical Pharmacy and Epidemiology at the University of Basel. This dissertation covers 
the topic of substandard medicines (SSMs), a global health issue (1) that is underestimated 
and inadequately understood due to its complexity (2). Substandard medicines are licensed 
medicines (3), either innovator or generic (4) that most commonly contain either too little or 
too much active pharmaceutical ingredient (API) (4). SSMs may be the result of negligence, 
error and/or low standard of quality control (QC) of the manufacturing process (non-good 
manufacturing accredited status) or distribution process (degradation of medicinal products 
through bad storage) (5). 
 
The use of SSMs may result in severe adverse events (AEs) and even death (6) and may 
promote antimicrobial resistance (4). The presence of SSMs is not unique to developing 
countries (6) as there are examples of SSMs in Iceland (7), Portugal (8) Canada (9) among others. 
This  issue afflicts vulnerable patient populations worldwide (1).  
However, the true extent of this hazard is unknown as systematic and comprehensive 
prevalence studies are lacking to date (10). There is a shortage of robust evidence of SSMs 
(11) as reports on SSMs are often found in “grey literature” and newspapers (12).  Estimates 
are primarily available for antimicrobial medicines (13,14). The existence of  SSMs may be 
a result of weak regulatory systems and limited access to medicines in many countries (12). 
Due to their similarities SSMs and falsified medicines are usually seen as one and the same 
problem, however in many aspects they are independent problems  that require different 
solutions (15). While falsified medicines are illegal, unlicensed and are manufactured 
deliberately to deceive as to source and content (i.e. they often contain minimal or no active 
pharmaceutical ingredient), SSMs result from manufacturer`s “negligent breach of 
regulator’s legal requirements” (16) such as error in manufacture or distribution (17). 
Globalization and parallel imports in Europe have substantially contributed to the existence 
of an increasingly (18) complex pharmaceutical supply chain (19). “Medicines constantly 
change hands between production and dispensing to the patient” (20) (through 
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manufacturers, importers, wholesalers) and the multiple transactions facilitate falsified and 
substandard medicines to penetrate the global legitimate medicine supply chain (21,22). 
Regular QC and post-marketing surveillance of pharmaceuticals have been a critical 
challenge for countries of the developing world ever since (23) and the detection of SSMs 
(24) is difficult as they do not usually differ in appearance but are characterized mainly by 
altered chemical content and reduced bioavailability of the active pharmaceutical ingredient 
(14).  
 
My thesis addresses the serious implications of SSMs to public health care  and describes 
attempts to bridge the apparent gap of detecting SSMs (25) by exploring new detection 
approaches in pharmacovigilance and in analytical technologies as well as validating these 
methods in field studies.  
Currently SSMs are only identified by analytical devices (26). Because of their high costs 
and portability issues (26) most of the analytical technologies cannot be used in resource-
limited countries. Evidence of high increases of SSMs, predominantly in developing 
countries, reveals that there is a need for easy, rapid and affordable detection tools (27). 
Currently, there is no portable screening device in the market that can accurately measure 
the content of active pharmaceutical ingredients (API) of medicinal samples (28). The only 
available device is PharmaChk, an innovative analytical instrument in development that is 
able to quantify the amount of a number of APIs (e.g. artemisinin, tetracycline) and evaluate 
their dissolution profile (29). In collaboration with the Biomechanical Department of Boston 
University, we conducted further research on this device and the assay for essential 
antimalarial drug Coartem® (artemether and lumefantrine) (30) was developed and used for 
a field study in Zimbabwe.  
 
In addition to analytical detection, pharmacovigilance signal detection techniques have been 
shown to be effective in detecting SSMs. Preliminary research conducted by the WHO 
Uppsala Monitoring Centre (UMC) exists on using data mining algorithms on the WHO 
Vigibase® data set of global individual case safety reports (ICSRs) to identify SSMs (31). 
In my thesis this preliminary research was validated and further extended by using the 
empirical Bayes multi-item gamma poisson shrinker (MGPS) disproportionality algorithm. 
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We conducted three different stratification analyses using 24 preferred terms (PTs) 
indicative of defective medicines. A cut-off of EB05 [lower confidence limits for the 
Empirical Bayes Geometric Mean (EBGM)] (32) greater than two was used to identify 
clusters of SSMs. We were able to not only confirm clusters of ethinylestradiol and 
salbutamol identified by the UMC in 2014 (33), but we also found evidence of a substandard 
rivastigmine patch which resulted in advisory letters to health care professionals from an 
independent organisation of pharmacists working in support of the Competent Authority in 
the Netherlands.  
 
After validation of this pharmacovigilance screening tool and the assay of Coartem® on the 
PharmaChk device and in order to assess the efficiency of these two detection approaches 
of SSMs in real world practice, we initiated a field study on Coartem® and its generic 
versions in Zimbabwe. Malaria is a major health burden in Zimbabwe with 8,000,000 people  
at risk (50% of the population) (34). Previous studies have shown that Zimbabweans are at 
high risk from substandard and falsified medicines, resulting in increased mortality, 
morbidity, financial strain and long-term antimicrobial resistance (35–37). We collected 
samples from sites of the private health sector that were randomly selected as well as from 
sites that were conveniently accessible. The purchase of samples where sellers were blinded 
to the intent of our research was performed in 18 cities in areas with high risk for malaria in 
Zimbabwe.  
 
The quality of purchased samples was tested through qualitative and quantitative 
measurements using different screening field devices including Raman, Near-Infrared (NIR) 
spectrometry and X-Ray Fluorescence (XFR) as well as spectrophotometer and high 
performance liquid chromatography (HPLC) analysis for confirmatory analysis in analytical 
laboratories in Zimbabwe, Switzerland and the United States (US).  Data mining for the 
antimalarial drug Coartem® identified no excess reporting of AEs related to Coartem® in 
Zimbabwe. No data on the registered generic versions of Coartem® in the Vigibase® database 
(38) was available for Zimbabwe.  
Analyses of all screening and confirmatory analytical technologies revealed a good quality 
of all collected samples. The PharmaChk device demonstrated comparable results of the 
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collected samples to the gold standard method, which is HPLC. The analytical screening 
tool PharmaChk was able to determine that there was no unexpected risk with essential 
medicine artemether/lumefantrine in Zimbabwe. This pilot study highlighted the potential 
of these two detection methods. However, further research on a larger scale of samples and 
other therapeutic areas is required to validate these findings. Moreover, the proposed 
flowchart (Figure 23) includes both detection methods to triage suspected medicinal samples 
for further confirmatory testing which may result in reduction of  resources, analysis time 
and money. Both tools can be applied by multiple and diverse stakeholders. The 
pharmacovigilance detection tool can be targeted by regulators, NGOs and manufacturers 
whereas the PharmaChk device can be used by healthcare professionals (HCPs) in hospitals, 
pharmacists, manufacturers and customs officers.  
 
This thesis highlights the need and importance of collaborations in identifying SSMs. 
Without the partnership between academia, industry and private laboratory institutions this 
research may have not been possible. The complex issue of SSMs requires this kind of  
engagement to enhance safe and effective medical treatment by decreasing the number of 
circulating SSMs worldwide.  
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II Introduction 
A high quality of medicines is a characteristic that is often taken for granted (39). Over time, 
drug development has led to an increasing importance of quality as demonstrated by the 
implementation of universally accepted laws in healthcare systems worldwide. One of the 
UN targets the year 2030 is to “achieve access to safe, effective, quality and affordable 
essential medicines and vaccines for all” (35,40). 
 
Medicines are used to treat, cure, or prevent diseases. According to the WHO “all medicines 
must meet three criteria: be of good quality, safe and effective” (41). All authorized 
(licenced) medicines must meet a documented quality specification, and there should be a 
positive benefit to risk assessment, such that the benefits outweigh the potential harms (42). 
The distribution of medicines with low quality and/or safety has become a global threat and 
the use of low quality medicines may have severe impact on public health (43). Patients may 
suffer from serious adverse events (SAEs), treatment failures due to drug resistances, and in 
the worst case scenario, death (44). Moreover SSMs (“refer to medicinal products that do 
not meet the quality specifications given in the accepted pharmacopoeia” (45) [Chapter 2] 
may lead to the loss of patient’s confidence in medicines and in the healthcare system  (46). 
The consequences do not only affect the end users (patients) but all stakeholders involved 
in the medicines supply chain. Use of drugs with poor quality may result in a financial loss 
for patients and their families, the healthcare system and the pharmaceutical manufacturers. 
In addition it may involve increased burden for HCPs, regulatory authorities, and customs 
officers (47).    
Literature search on “counterfeit” medicines reveals that there are “guidelines for 
development of measures to combat counterfeit drugs” (48) as well as the “EU Falsified 
Medicines Directive”(49) and significantly more research articles on falsified medicines 
than there are on SSMs (50). 
 
The prevalence of poor quality medicines worldwide is not known, but the increase in the 
number of quality defect reports on SSMs is alarming (51). According to Nayyar et al. (52), 
the testing results of 16,800 samples of antimalarial drugs, anti-tuberculosis medicines, 
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antibiotic and anti-leishmaniasis drugs in seven studies showed that 9-41% failed to meet 
quality standards. Cases are not only reported from emerging market countries (Sub-Saharan 
African countries as well as Asian and Latin American regions) (53) (54). A retrospective 
review of drug alerts and drug recalls issued by the Medicines and Healthcare Products 
Regulatory Agency (MHRA) in the United Kingdom (2001-2011) [UK] performed by 
Alumzaini et al. (55) revealed that there were 280 SSMs of which 222 were recalled mainly 
due to contamination of parenteral formulations (74 incidents) and issues relating to 
packaging (98 incidents). The number of SSMs in UK increased 10 fold from 5 incidents in 
2001 to 50 incidents in 2011 (55). 
 
The supply chain for medicines worldwide delivers high quality medicines to patients but 
also an increasing amount of SSMs that is dispensed by unlicensed pharmacies, hospitals, 
illicit medicines outlets or can be purchased through unregulated websites. SSMs are 
difficult to detect as usually they cannot be detected by appearance, “however they often fail 
to properly treat the disease or condition they were intended” (44). Currently defective 
medicines can only be properly identified using analytical methods (56). In general many 
detection instruments verify the presence of the main API and therefore mainly focus on 
“counterfeit” medication. In order to identify SSMs, devices able to perform quantitative 
analysis for determination of impurities and amount of main ingredients are required (57). 
Aims and Scope 
The primary focus of my research described in this thesis are SSMs. However in literature, 
SSMs are often conflated with falsified medicines which makes it crucial to differentiate 
between SSMs and falsified medicines (14). While falsified medication results from a 
“deliberate or intentional act to mislead any person concerning a medical product”, 
substandard medications may also emerge from unintentional errors in the manufacturing 
process by licensed producers or degradation that occurs within in the supply chain (58). 
 
The aim is to investigate innovative statistical and analytical detection methods for 
identifying SSMs in developed, as well as in low-income countries (Sub-Saharan African 
countries as well as Asian and Latin American regions), as well as contribute to efforts of the 
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scientific community undertaken globally to ensure access to medicines of good quality and 
with a favourable benefit-risk assessment for patients worldwide. 
 
The application of the presented statistical and analytical detection methods will allow 
health authorities, pharmaceutical companies and pharmacies both in developed as well as 
resource-limited countries to identify SSMs even before they would be dispensed to patients.  
 
This thesis is divided into the following parts: After the background section on SSMs 
(Chapter 1-6) which gives an overview on SSMs, including the epidemiology, the 
delimitation to falsified medicines and the worldwide impact on public health,  
 
Part 1 (Chapters 7-8) illustrates a statistical approach using pharmacovigilance tools to 
detect SSMs. A non-analytical detection tool was introduced by Uppsala Monitoring Centre 
(UMC) in 2011 in the Monitoring Medicines project (59). Preliminary research exists on 
using data mining algorithms on spontaneous reports to identify poor quality medicines (60). 
In this thesis this preliminary research was validated and further extended by using a 
different statistical methodology.  
 
Part 2 (Chapter 9) refers to the analytical screening tool PharmaChk to identify poorly 
manufactured medicines especially in emerging countries. Most of the commonly used 
analytical devices to identify SSMs cannot be used in resource limited countries. The main 
reasons are bulkiness of the instruments, the high price and the lack of trained personnel 
(61). To address the need of detecting SSMs in low-income countries, we assessed the 
efficiency of the PharmaChk device in Zimbabwe by comparing it to the gold standard 
method HPLC.  
 
Part 3 (Chapters 10-12) describes an ongoing pilot field study performed in Zimbabwe to 
identify potential substandard and falsified antimalarial medicine samples of fixed-dose 
combination drug of artemether and lumefantrine (coartemether) sourced from the private 
sector. This study  used the pharmacovigilance tool outlined in Part 1 and the quantitative 
screening device PharmaChk described in Part 2. 
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Chapters 13-15 present the final discussion, future outlook and overall conclusion of this 
research project. 
 
For the purpose of this thesis, the term “falsified medicines” will be used instead of “counterfeit 
medicines” as these are associated with intellectual property legislation and trademark protection. 
In addition the terms drug, medicine and pharmaceutical products are used interchangeably to refer 
to medicinal products intended for prophylactic, diagnostic or therapeutic use as well as poor 
quality medicines and defective medicines (62). 
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III Background 
 
1 History of SSMs 
The concern about the quality of medicines is an ancient problem. There have been writings 
from the fourth century before Christ (BCE) on the dangers of adulterated drugs and in the 
first century  Common Era (CE) the Greek physician Dioscorides described detection 
methods of these products in his Materia Medica (63,64). Despite all the advances in 
regulations for medicines quality over a millenium, history reveals tragic consequences of 
SSMs (65).  
 
In 1901, the standard treatment for children with diphtheria was an antitoxin derived from the 
blood serum of horses. The serum of a horse who contracted tetanus was accidentally bottled and 
used to treat diphtheria patients, causing the death of 13 children. The serum had been 
manufactured in local establishments with no uniform quality controls in place to ensure potency 
and purity. In addition no analysis of the final antitoxin was performed. At the same time a similar 
tragedy occurred in Camden, New Jersey, where nine children died from tetanus after receiving 
contaminated smallpox vaccine. These two tragedies led to the adoption of Biologics Control Act 
(first "Virus-Toxin Law") in 1902 (66).  
 
Another example of fatal consequences of SSMs dispensed to patients occurred 35 years later. In 
1937 more than 100 patients, most of them children, died in 15 US-States because of being 
exposed to a poisoned by elixir of sulfanilamide, a new formulation which had not been 
analyzed for toxicity, as this at the time was not legally required. It contained 10% solution 
of sulfanilamide to treat streptococcal infections and 72% diethylene glycol used as solvent 
which turned out to be the lethal ingredient (67). All patients exhibited kidney failure 
symptoms and intense pain. The manufacturer was unaware of the toxicity of diethylene 
glycol (68). This incident led to the enactment of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 
on 25th June 1938 which obliged manufacturers to assure the safety of a drug before it could 
be marketed by Food and Drug Administration (FDA) (69,70).  
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The course of history reveals that “many human lives have been sacrificed by failure to meet 
the standards” (71) of good quality medicines. The aforementioned tragedies should serve 
as a warning. It was 1985 at the conference on the rational use of drugs in Nairobi when the 
problem of poor quality medicines was brought to the attention of international regulatory 
community (63,72).   
 
Unless adequate medicine quality standards are not put into effect, several more lives or 
injuries among public are exposed to risk every day. “Any essential compromise with these 
requirements will inevitably exact a toll of deaths or injuries among the public. The life and 
safety of the individual should not be subordinated to the competitive system of drug 
exploitation” (71). 
2 Definition debate of substandard and falsified (SF) medicinal products 
The controversial topic of terminology of what is SSM, falsified or counterfeit medicines 
has created lots of confusion (73) among the world scientific community as to date there are 
no universally agreed legal definitions available (74). A variety of definitions exist in many 
countries due to the “influence of the native languages as well as the preexisting local legal 
terminology” (75). Although the burden of SSMs on public health has been present and 
known for many centuries, the first definition of SSMs was introduced by the WHO as 
recently as 2011, whereas counterfeit medicines were first defined in 1992 (76).  
 
In 2010 the WHO introduced the wording SSFFC (substandard, spurious, falsely labelled, 
falsified and counterfeit) medicinal products which combined SSMs and falsified medicines 
into one category (77,78). Since 29th May 2017 the definitions for “Substandard and Falsified 
medical products” were revised at the Seventieth World Health Assembly. The term 
“SSFFC” has been replaced by “Substandard and Falsified medical products”(79). Moreover 
in all future documentation the terminology “falsified” will be used instead of “counterfeit” 
in order to prevent trademark infringement (73). According to Michael Deats, Group Lead 
of the Safety and Vigilance (SAV) team at the WHO (80), all member states have approved 
the revised definitions (81).  
 
 25 
 
The definitions of poor quality medicines introduced by WHO have been grouped into three 
categories (82):  
Substandard: Also called “out of specification”, are authorized medical products that fail 
to meet either their quality standards or specifications, or both.” According to Michael Deats 
(80,81) degraded medicines also fall into the category of SSMs (81). Moreover the deliberate 
production of SSMs by authorized manufacturers should be considered “falsified” (82).    
Unregistered/unlicensed: Medical products that have not undergone evaluation and/or 
approval by the National or Regional Regulatory Authority (NRRA) for the market in which 
they are marketed/distributed or used, subject to permitted conditions under national or 
regional regulation and legislation. 
Falsified: Medical products that deliberately/fraudulently misrepresent their identity, 
composition or source. When the authorized manufacturer deliberately fails to meet these 
quality standards or specifications due to misrepresentation of identity, composition, or 
source, then the medical product should be considered “falsified”.  
The WHO anticipates that all stakeholders will adopt these new definitions to allow accurate 
analysis of data and combat more effectively  against substandard and falsified medical 
products (79). Ongoing definition debates from 1992 until present on “counterfeit” drugs 
reflects the concerted effort of WHO in developing and coordinating various resolutions, 
sophisticated initiatives and international cooperation to tackle medicine counterfeiting (83) 
whereas there have been only limited endeavors on the field of SSMs (84). Universally 
agreed definitions are crucial to understand the magnitude of this global issue (85). The 
absence of commonly agreed definitions impedes the development of solutions to fight 
against this major challenge of falsified and SSMs. 
3 Differences between substandard and falsified medicines  
Good quality medicines comply with good manufacturing (GMP) and good distribution practice 
requirements (GDP) and lead to effective treatment and prevention of diseases. As mentioned in 
the chapter above the terms “substandard medicines and falsified medicines” have often been 
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conflated and in most scientific articles have been used interchangeably (14,78,86). Although there 
are many similarities between the two categories, they “have different origins and different 
solutions” (87). SSMs represent a worldwide health impediment in developed and developing 
countries for both branded and generic medicines, however the precise extent of the hazard is still 
unknown (78) [Chapter 4].  
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Figure 1 Differences between good quality, substandard and falsified medicines (4,88,89,90) 
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intentional production of falsified medicines versus non-deliberate and accidental manufacturing 
error of SSMs [Figure 1] (91). While “falsified medicines can be considered as being substandard” 
(82,92), not necessarily all SSMs can be denoted as falsified (93). The accidental manufacturing 
of SSMs or degradation of medicinal products due to exposure to heat for example are errors or 
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accidents which are surely negligent but do not represent a serious crime (93). A regulatory 
inspection as a response could be an appropriate measure to enable the manufacturer to comply 
with good GxP practices in the future. In contrast, the intentional production of unregistered 
medicines and SSMs, leading to the release of falsified medicines, is a serious public health crime 
and requires criminal sanctions (16). As SSMs may result from accidental non-compliance with 
GMP and GDP practices there is a broad variety of deficiencies in manufacturing and distribution 
processes (4) (Figure 2 below). Medicinal products “that were originally of good quality may 
degrade and become substandard during routine transport and storage, especially if stored beyond 
their expiry date and if exposed to extremes of humidity and temperature” (6). The retrospective 
analysis of 128 quality defects (including reports on falsified medicinal products, rapid alerts, 
reports of products with statements of non-compliance with GMP, reports of withdrawal of 
certification of suitability and warning letters) received by European Medicines Agency (EMA) in 
2016 revealed that the most reported causes for SSMs were manufacturing laboratory controls 
issues (out of specification test results) (53%) and product label issues (47%) (94). 
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Figure 2 Quality defects resulting in SSMs (4,95) (16) 
 
  
 
There is much more attention and awareness on falsified medicines than on SSMs (6). This can be 
seen by the existence of various global initiatives concerning falsified medicines since 1992 (76), 
funded by health authorities and the pharmaceutical industry (96) as well as by the number of 
published scientific articles (50). The analysis of the literature portal PubMed (97) in August 2017 
showed the presence of 588 research articles on the topic of “counterfeit medicines” since 1966 
whereas only 54 research articles on SSMs were published from September 1994 - September 
2017 (Figure 3). The graph (Figure 3) below also demonstrates that most of the scientific research 
was conducted after year 2000 for both falsified medicines and SSMs.  
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Figure 3 Research articles on substandard and “counterfeit medicines” until September 2017 
  
4 Widely unknown estimate of epidemiology of SSMs  
There is insufficient data in the scientific literature to determine the precise estimate of prevalence 
of SSMs distributed worldwide (10,98,99,100). It has been suggested in the literature that the 
majority of reported SSFFC medicines were substandard, failing API content and 
dissolution/disintegration tests, rather than counterfeit (101). To accurately determine the 
prevalence of SSMs, there have been limited number of studies using random sampling techniques 
and covert approach (14,99). Data exist on only few pharmaceutical classes including 
antimalarials, antibiotics and antiretrovirals (14). No prevalence study has been performed in 
developed countries although number of medicinal recalls have risen dramatically in the last 
decade (9,55). The following three review articles provide a comprehensive overview on existing 
prevalence studies on SSMs and their results. 
Considering the timeframe 1948-2013, Almuzaini et al. (13) identified 44 studies predominantly 
on antimicrobial medicines in 25 different lower middle-income countries. Only 15 of these studies 
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met the quality assessment criteria from the medicine quality assessment reporting guidelines 
(MEDQUARG) checklist (11). Most of the studies did not distinguish between substandard and 
falsified medicines. The median prevalence of falsified or SSMs was about 28.5% with a large 
range between 11-48%. They concluded that the prevalence of poor quality samples sourced from 
unlicensed outlets was significantly higher than those procured from licensed outlets from the 
public and private health sector. Moreover most of the SF samples contained inadequate amounts 
of APIs. No prevalence data was found in high-income countries (13).  
 
Similar findings were shown in a meta-analysis conducted by the U.S. Pharmacopoeial Convention 
on the publicly available medicines quality database (MQDB) for the period of 2003-2013 in 17 
countries of Africa, Asia, and South America. Out of 15’063 collected medicine samples, 767 
samples were of substandard quality (90.4%). Overall, a failure rate of 11.5% was observed in 
South America, 10.7% in Africa and 3.5% in Asia. Antimalarial, antibiotic and antituberculous 
medicinal products revealed the highest distribution of SSMs by therapeutic indication (102).   
 
Torloni et al. reviewed the quality of oxytocin and determined that the median prevalence of 
samples that failed the quality analysis was 45.6% in a range of 0-80%. They found that more than 
one third of the acquired samples from 15 countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America were 
substandard due to insufficient API content (<90%) (103).   
 
The reviews reveal that due to the paucity of data it is very difficult to determine the accurate 
prevalence of SSMs (104). The prevalent data is biased towards antimicrobials particularly 
antimalarials (104). Moreover the prevalence results need to be interpreted with caution as many 
of the studies were conducted with inadequate sampling designs such as convenience-based 
sampling, insufficient sample sized and standardized chemical analysis techniques and instruments 
(104,105). In addition these estimates vary by time and place (106). Surveys with strong 
methodology are conducted in various therapeutic indications including non-communicable 
chronic diseases and specific countries (107) are required to better understand the scale/magnitude 
of the problem (13,99,104).  
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5 Adverse health outcomes and societal effects of SSMs: Quality of medicines 
matters (4,108-109) 
Since SSMs have a multifaceted origin, these may lead to various adverse health outcomes 
including treatment failures (due to lack of efficacy), increased mortality (for the same reason) and 
support of promulgation of resistances (4,110-111). 
  
The serious illness burden generated by these medicines is insufficiently quantified. Fernandes et 
al. indicated that SSMs contribute  to over 100,000 preventable deaths annually (111). The first 
evidence-based estimate (106) was provided by Renschler et al in 2009. They estimated that the 
deaths of 122,350 children under-five suffering from malaria were associated with consumption 
of poor-quality antimalarials, representing 3.75% of all deaths in children under five years of age 
in their sample of 39 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (105). Most of the deaths caused by SSMs 
involved the contamination with diethylene glycol (67–71). 
 
The analysis of scientific literature in addition to the 27 WHO medical product alerts on defective 
medicines from 1989 until now reveals that there have been many reports of serious clinical AEs 
and fatalities. Principally, the causes can be categorized into seven groups. In the following Table 
1these are described with illustrative examples highlighted (4,95). 
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Table 1 Causes and outcomes of SSMs based on examples 
Clinical outcomes of 
SSMs 
Incidence example 
Intoxication through 
contamination of the 
active pharmaceutical 
ingredient (API) 
 
In January 2013 two types of locally produced cough syrups led to 50 
deaths in Pakistan due to contaminated API dextromethorphan with 
varying levels of levomethorphan which is an opioid analgesic. Eight 
months later, reports of suspected dextromethorphan intoxication 
appeared from 44 patients in Paraguay who had developed serious 
adverse reactions including seizures and respiratory distress and one 
death. The Paraguayan authority revealed that the API 
dextromethorphan was procured in the same laboratory in India that 
was used by the cough syrup manufacturer in Pakistan and the batch 
number resembled. Samples of both incidents did not fulfill the 
specific optical rotation requirement of the International 
Pharmacopoeia (112). 
Contamination with 
impurities and additives 
not declared on the label 
In January 2012, there was a serious incident with 125 deaths and 
more than 450 cardiac patients with fatal AEs in Pakistan as a result 
of fatal bone-marrow suppression after taking the inadvertent tainted 
isosorbide 5 mononitrate contaminated with an excessive dose of 
pyrimethamine (113–115).  
Sterility issues through 
microbial contamination 
 
In September 2012, there was the largest outbreak of fungal 
meningitis in several states in US due to bacterial and / or fungal 
contaminated steroid injection prepared by New England 
Compounding Center (NECC) in Massachusetts. This incidence lead 
to 751 cases of fungal meningitis, stroke, spinal or paraspinal 
infection and 64 deaths (116,117). In the case of fungal meningitis as 
described above, therapy had to be continued for at least 6 months 
and few patients had to remain on long-term therapy.  
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Mislabeling 
 
In 2001 there were reports of deaths of two premature infants after 
receiving injections of potassium chloride instead of glucose 5% / 
10ml sterile solution due to mislabeling of the medicinal product 
(118).  
Insufficient or excess 
amount of correct API 
than stated on the label 
After the administration of substandard propofol in Zambia in 2015, 
patients experienced various AEs including urticaria, bronchospasm 
and inadequate depth of anesthesia. The laboratory analysis 
concluded that none of the analyzed vials contained the declared 
amount of propofol (119).  
Non-compliance with 
dissolution tolerance 
limits (bioavailability) 
(14) 
 
According to Leslie et al. 2009 the locally manufactured generic 
sulfadoxine/pyrimethamine tablets, sourced due to shortages of 
Fansidar, contributed to malaria epidemic in a refugee camp in 
Pakistan. The dissolution profile (120) of the generic tablets did not 
comply with the stated tolerance limits, therefore the tablets were not 
released at the required dose (121). 
Unstable formulation 
 
The study of Mastoraki et al. showed a higher incidence of post-
operative infections in adult patients undergoing coronary artery 
bypass grafting surgery after receiving generic version of 
cefuroxime. The reason for this clinical implication was the use of 
substandard generic antimicrobial prophylaxis resulting from the 
degradation of the generic formulation into two ineffective parts 
(120). 
 
In addition to the clinical implications the unintentional use of SSMs will presumably result in a 
loss of confidence of patients and HCPs into their healthcare system as ineffective medicines lead 
to treatment failure due to inadvertent suboptimal dosing (4). Moreover this contributes to a severe 
public health financial burden which mainly affects vulnerable patients (1). According to 
Fernandes et al. SSMs account for 7.8% of the net market value (111). Costs include payment for 
replacement therapy, additional drugs to cure the adverse effects or repeated courses, costs for lost 
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productivity in addition to increased direct healthcare costs as well as the necessity to develop new 
medicines against resistances (4). In order to break out of this circle, cooperation between the 
multiple national, regional and international stakeholders needs to be strengthened and intensified. 
Ideally a globally harmonised process system and guidelines are required (e.g. pharmacovigilance, 
quality testing), which are evidence-based and directed towards the detection, identification and 
removal SSMs from the market place- that is the only way that healthcare providers can jointly 
protect patients health worldwide. 
 
6 Regulations and sanctions to prevent SSMs  
The production and dissemination of each pharmaceutical product has to adhere to the principles 
of good clinical (GCP), manufacturing (GMP), distribution (GDP), pharmacovigilance practices 
(GVP) and guidelines of the International Conference on Harmonization (ICH) (122). These 
include post-marketing surveillance activities, regular inspection of manufacturers and the supply 
chain (wholesalers, distributors, retailers) by health authorities. QC testing as well as 
implementation of regulatory actions in the case of incompliance (123–125). A detailed 
specification for each of the approved medicinal products is set down in the marketing 
authorization (126).  
 
SSMs mainly arise due to non-compliance with standards for GMP, GCP and GVP for centrally 
and nationally authorized products (127). They are the results of inadvertent manufacturing errors 
by legitimate manufacturers, negligent distribution practices of suppliers, human error or 
insufficient human and financial resources (128,129). In case of detection of SSMs, there are 
regulations in place for manufacturing authorization holders including measures such as the recall 
of defective batches of a medicinal product from the market. The authorization holder is required 
to notify the relevant Competent Authority of any defect or abnormal restriction that could result 
in a recall (130). Moreover the Committee for Medicinal Products for Human Use (CHMP) 
performs entire benefit risk assessments of medicines to ascertain whether the marketing 
authorizations for these medicines should be maintained, varied, suspended or withdrawn (131). 
There are countries in the world (e.g. Latin America, Africa, Middle East), mostly developing 
countries, where either guidelines on quality, safety and efficacy could potentially differ from FDA 
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and EMA guidelines or guidelines are not enforced which inevitably could allow easier 
proliferation of SSMs (106).  
 
A subsidiary of Glaxo Smith-Kline, PLC (GSK) received a settlement of civil and criminal charges 
of 750 million $US in 2010 from the US Department of Justice (DOJ) regarding production and 
distribution of several SSMs between 2001 and 2005 (132). Reasons for the  substandard nature 
of the medicinal products were microbial contamination, potential sub- therapeutic or toxic levels 
of API and product mix-ups (133). Likewise Ranbaxy USA Inc. had to pay 150 million $US for 
production and dissemination of certain adulterated medicines made at two of their manufacturing 
facilities in India (134).  
 
Amir Attaran described that there are great variabilities considering sanctions for SSMs in different 
countries (135). In the Netherlands, manufacturing a substandard medicine for the second time in 
two years is a criminal act and will result to an imprisonment of maximum six months (135) 
whereas in India, imprisonment for ten years or for lifetime with high penalties are imposed when 
SSMs cause death (136).   
  
If SSMs are produced with intentional deceit, denoted as falsified medicines according to the new 
WHO definition (82), different policies are in place such as the Directive on prevention of the 
entry into the legal supply chain of falsified medicinal products (colloquially known as the 
`̒Falsified Medicines Directive̕ (2011/62/EU) (137). This Directive aims to prevent falsified 
medicines entering the legitimate supply chain and reaching patients by introducing four measures 
which will come into force on 9th February 2019 in most of the European countries (122). These 
actions include placement of two safety features on the packaging; revision of GDP guideline by 
adding new responsibilities for wholesalers; appending written confirmation from regulatory 
authority of exporting country for all active substances manufactured outside the EU certifying 
“GMP and control of the manufacturing site are equivalent to those in the EU”, (138) and 
application of an obligatory logo on the websites of legally operating online pharmacies and 
approved retailers in the EU (applicable since 1st July 2015) (90,137). “The effective enforcement 
of existing penalties is crucial in addressing the falsification of medicines, active substances and 
excipients.” This is stated in Article 118a of Directice 2001/83/EC (90). In January 2018 a 
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qualitative assessment of the effectiveness of criminal and civil penalties as well as administrative 
sanctions for the falsification of medicines in 28 EU countries was performed. It was concluded 
that all participating countries applied prison sentences for the falsification of medicines (at least 
three years in 20 EU member states). Due to the scarcity of data “on incidents in the Member 
States” it was difficult to evaluate the efficacy of the penalties.   But overall in about 50% of the 
Member States administrative sanctions “were rated as effective” to reduce the presence of 
falsified medicines in the legal supply chain”. For purchases of medicines from illegal online 
pharmacies, criminal penalties are more effective than administrative sanctions (90).  
 
The most recent incident of deliberate manufacturing of SSMs affected many patients in Germany 
where a pharmacist manipulated the pharmaceutical preparation of more than 50,000 individual 
anticancer treatments including the supply of 30 clinical trials. “The pharmacist violated 
Germany`s medicinal products law in 61,980 cases between 2012 and 2016” (139).  This case was 
discovered by careful investigation, that the pharmacist had purchased less material (range 20-
80%) than he had invoiced from the health assurance providers. The financial damage to the 
insurance companies amount to 65 million $US over 59 months (139). Thus, he had manufactured 
oncology preparations with suboptimal dosing (140). The pharmacist was arrested on the 28. 
November 2016 (139).     
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7 Part 1: Detection of SSMs by applying statistical methods on adverse effects 
of medicinal products  
 
Adverse effects of medicinal products  represent the core component of Pharmacovigilance (PV) 
which is defined as the science and activities related to the detection, assessment, understanding 
and prevention of adverse effects or any other medicinal product-related problem (141–143). In 
order to improve public health by enhanced safety monitoring of drugs, health authorities have 
implemented several pharmacovigilance databases (144) where AEs and suspected adverse 
reactions are being collected and can be accessed by the public (e.g. Vigibase®, FDA Adverse 
Event Reporting System).  
 
Since 2011 there have been ongoing efforts by the WHO on pharmacovigilance database 
Vigibase® to identify SSMs with statistical analysis based on AE reports (31,145). However, a 
broad literature search has confirmed that currently there is no gold standard method available in 
pharmacovigilance for detection of SSMs.  
 
Vigibase® 
The WHO global individual cases safety report (ICSR) database Vigibase® was generated in 1968 
and is maintained by the UMC on behalf of the WHO. ICSRs have been received at the UMC from 
over 125 national or regional pharmacovigilance systems. Currently this computerized 
pharmacovigilance database contains in excess of 16 million spontaneous reports, making this 
currently the biggest safety database worldwide. The advantage of using spontaneous reporting for 
continuous data collection are low maintenance costs, indication of reporting countries and broad 
coverage of population treated with a wide range of medicinal products (146). 
 
The research presented in the following section “has augmented and extended previous work 
conducted by UMC (31,33). This study included all marketed medicines in Vigibase® based 
on the 24 MedDRA® terms indicative of product quality defects containing valsartan, 
methylphenidate, rivastigmine, clozapine, or carbamazepine.”(147)  
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The analysis of Vigibase® is documented in the following manuscript published in Drug 
Safety Journal on 28th January 2017 (DOI 10.007/s40264-016-0499-5) (147). 
8 Identification of substandard medicines via disproportionality analysis of 
individual case safety reports 
Zahra Anita Trippe1,2, Bruno Brendani1, Christoph Meier2, David Lewis1,3  
1 Patient Safety Novartis Pharma AG, Basel, Switzerland 
2 Division of Clinical Pharmacy and Epidemiology, Department of Pharmaceutical Sciences, 
University  
of Basel, Switzerland 
3 School of Life and Medical Sciences, University of Hertfordshire, Hatfield, England, UK 
 
Abstract 
Introduction  
The distribution and use of SSMs is a public health concern worldwide. The detection of SSMs is 
currently limited to expensive large-scale assay techniques such as HPLC. Since 2013, the 
Pharmacovigilance Department at Novartis Pharma AG has been analyzing drug-associated AEs 
related to ‘product quality issues’ with the aim of detecting defective medicines using spontaneous 
reporting. The method of identifying SSMs with spontaneous reporting was pioneered by the 
Monitoring Medicines project in 2011. 
 
Methods 
This retrospective review was based on data from the WHO Global ICSR database VigiBase® 
collected from January 2001 to December 2014. We conducted three different stratification 
analyses using the MGPS algorithm through the Oracle Empirica data-mining software. In total, 
24 PTs from the Medical Dictionary for Regulatory Activities (MedDRA®) were used to identify 
poor-quality medicines. To identify potential SSMs for further evaluation, a cutoff of 2.0 for EB05, 
the lower 95% interval of the EBGM was applied. We carried out a literature search for advisory 
letters related to defective medicinal products to validate our findings. Furthermore, we aimed to 
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assess whether we could confirm two SSMs first identified by the UMC with our stratification 
method. 
 
Results 
The analysis of ICSRs based on the specified selection criteria and threshold yielded 2506 hits 
including medicinal products with an excess of reports of product quality defects relative to other 
medicines in the database. Further investigations and a pilot study in five authorized medicinal 
products (proprietary and generic) licensed by a single marketing authorization holder, containing 
(valsartan, methylphenidate, rivastigmine, clozapine, or carbamazepine) were performed. This 
resulted in an output of 23 potential SSMs. The literature search identified two communications 
issued to health professionals concerning a substandard rivastigmine patch, which validated our 
initial findings. Furthermore, we identified excess reporting of product quality issues with an 
ethinyl estradiol/norgestrel combination and with salbutamol. These were categorized as 
confirmed clusters of SSFFC medical products by the UMC in 2014. 
 
Conclusion 
This study illustrates the value of data mining of spontaneous AE reports and the applicability of 
disproportionality analysis to identify potential SSMs. 
 
Electronic supplementary material 
The online version of this article (doi:10.1007/s40264-016-0499-5) contains supplementary 
material, which is available to authorized users. 
 
Key Points 
Application of an appropriate signal-detection method and careful analysis of spontaneous 
reporting systems supports the monitoring of quality defects and can identify SSMs. 
Important challenges in the identification of SSMs include missing data from ICSRs as well as a 
lack of samples of suspected SSMs for verification testing, the latter being a direct result of the 
research being conducted retrospectively. 
 
 
 41 
 
1. Introduction 
By law, both innovative and generic medicines must be manufactured in accordance with 
regulatory requirements (148,149). A detailed specification for the finished product is set down in 
the marketing authorization (150). SSMs that do not conform with the specification—and therefore 
may compromise patient safety because of defects in the quantity of the active substance—may 
occur with both proprietary and generic medicines (4). The use of SSMs is a poorly researched 
public health concern worldwide (151,152). SSMs are not counterfeit, falsified, or fraudulent but 
are poor quality and represent a significant risk to patients. There is published evidence that the 
use of such medicines can result in treatment failure (12) or even death (153). 
 
1.1. Challenges Underlying the Detection of SSMs 
In total, 42 analytical technologies are available for identifying SSMs or falsified medicines, both 
devices for laboratory testing, such as the gold standard HPLC, and in-field testing devices such 
as Raman spectroscopy (26). The disadvantages of many laboratory testing devices are that they 
require laboratory facilities and highly trained personnel and that costs for these devices range 
from $US50,000 to 300,000. These instruments are not appropriate for routine product quality 
assessment in many of the low- and middle-income countries most affected by SSMs (26). Field 
devices are less expensive but also less sensitive. This study discusses an inexpensive and 
sustainable statistical detection method that can be applied in routine product quality assessments 
in all markets. 
 
1.2. Spontaneous Reporting Systems 
Spontaneous reporting systems represent the most common method of pharmacovigilance in the 
post marketing phase. They help generate hypotheses that could result in regulatory warning letters 
or changes to safety labels (154). Although it is generally not possible to establish absolute proof 
of failure to meet the authorized specification of a medicine from ICSRs in VigiBase® alone, as it 
is not possible to retrieve samples for confirmatory analysis testing, this data source can support 
the identification of hypotheses about potential poor-quality medicines associated with AEs 
(31,33). 
The Monitoring Medicines project coordinated by UMC in 2011 demonstrated that spontaneous 
reporting could provide an indication of the presence of SSFFC medical products in healthcare 
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systems. The UMC developed a signal-detection method in a retrospective setting using 24 
MedDRA® PTs indicative of inferior product quality within VigiBase®. A data-mining approach 
with three algorithms was applied to identify medicinal products associated with a higher-than-
expected number of ICSRs. The main determinant was the lower 95% confidence interval (CI) of 
the comparative information component IC∆ exceeding 0. Several clusters of medicinal products 
with excess reporting of potential quality issues were highlighted and confirmed by information 
on product recalls or deficiencies. In 2014, UMC implemented the developed algorithms on 
national pharmacovigilance data. Some of the identified clusters of the suspected SSMs could be 
validated by national regulators. Limitations of the survey included late ICSR submissions to 
Vigibase® and lack of data quality (155). 
 
This pilot study used a data-mining approach broadly analogous to that of the UMC Monitoring 
Medicines project, but we applied a different disproportionality algorithm to detect potential 
SSMs. We employed the three stratification strategies in the pilot study on all five active 
substances and compared the results, whereas the UMC Monitoring Medicines project used these 
data-mining approaches independently. The other main difference was that the Monitoring 
Medicines project focused on the detection of falsified medicines, whereas our study targeted the 
identification of potential SSMs. 
 
1.3. Objectives 
The primary objective was to evaluate whether disproportionality analysis applied to individual 
case reports, accompanied by statistical stratification techniques, could be used for the detection 
of potential SSMs. Furthermore, we aimed to validate these techniques by comparing the results 
against examples from the literature of known and previously evaluated cases of SSMs reported 
to Vigibase®. 
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2. Materials and Methods 
 
2.1. Data Source 
Vigibase® was selected as the basis for research to identify potential safety hazards associated with 
SSMs without identifying individual patients or the original source of the reports (156). We used 
the EB05 ratios produced by the Empirica Signal system, data-mining software (version 
7.3.3.0.354, ORACLE) applied to ICSRs in VigiBase®. 
 
2.2. Empirica Signal Application 
Empirica Signal is a high-performance implementation of the MGPS algorithm, which is linked to 
the marketing authorization holder (MAH) safety database, Argus Safety. For a drug–event 
combination (DEC), the adjusted value of an observed/expected ratio is denoted as the EBGM 
value (157). The MGPS data-mining algorithm includes the computation of two-sided 90% CIs 
(EB05 < EB95) for EBGM. In general, MAHs and regulatory authorities use an EB05 or 
EBGM > 2 as a screening threshold for observations of disproportional reporting (ODRs) (158). 
 
2.3. Data-Mining Analysis 
We used 24 MedDRA® (version 17.0) PTs considered indicative of potential SSMs for the AE 
data-mining queries. The PTs were the same as those applied by the Monitoring Medicines project 
in 2011 (31). The 24 MedDRA terms used in this study analysis were as follows:  
 
Drug ineffective; Therapeutic response unexpected; No therapeutic response; Therapeutic product 
ineffective; Therapeutic response unexpected with drug substitution; Therapeutic response 
decreased; Therapeutic response delayed; Product measured potency issue; Therapeutic response 
prolonged; Therapeutic response increased; Product quality issue; Drug effect increased; Product 
label issues; Unintended pregnancy; Physical product label issue; Product packaging quantity 
issue; Drug effect decreased; Product lot number issue; Product formulation issue; Drug effect 
delayed; Product barcode issue; Product identification number issue; Drug effect prolonged; Poor 
quality drug administered. 
 
 44 
 
Three different stratification strategies for detecting potential cases of product defects were 
assessed: 
 
1. Medicines with an excess number of reports on the selected PTs relative to all other products in 
Vigibase® in the specified timeframe. 
 
2. Medicines with an excess number of reports on the selected PTs relative to other products 
containing the same active pharmaceutical ingredients. 
 
3. Medicines with an excess number of reports on the selected PTs relative to other products 
containing the same pharmaceutical substances in a specific country and year. 
 
The third data-mining run was generated based on the stratification variables country and year of 
occurrence assuming the first and second data-mining runs showed an EB05 ≥ 2. 
 
We excluded all ICSRs that did not specify the name of the medicinal product (‘NOS’ [not 
otherwise specified] or generic names in VigiBase®) as the hit could refer to multiple trade names. 
To evaluate the statistical significance of the disproportional reporting ratios for each DEC, we 
analyzed reports of trade names with N ≥ 1 ICSRs; EBGM ≥ 2, and EB05 ≥ 2 (157). N was a 
significant index for monitoring the emergence of an AE but was independent of the signal score 
(55). 
 
The entire dataset within VigiBase® was systematically screened using the specified MedDRA® 
PTs for higher-than-expected DECs. Specific medicinal products with an EB05 ≥ 2 (Figure 4) 
were evaluated further.  
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Figure 4 Excess reporting of medicinal products in Vigibase® based on selected MedDRA 
preferred terms (EB05 ≥ 2) 
Output for all medicinal products (proprietary and generic as well as pharmaceuticals indicated by 
generic name or ‘not otherwise specified’) that were associated with a higher than expected number 
of individual case safety reports (EB05 ≥ 2), which warranted further investigation. EB05 fifth 
percentile of the confidence interval for the Empirical Bayes Geometric Mean   
 
 
 
We then performed a pilot study on five medicinal products originally licensed by a single 
manufacturer but no longer patent protected: valsartan, methylphenidate, rivastigmine, clozapine, 
and carbamazepine (Figure 5). 
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Figure 5 Excess reporting in Vigibase® (EB05 ≥ 2) of 23 proprietary and generic marketed 
medicines containing valsartan, methylphenidate, rivastigmine, clozapine, or 
carbamazepine 
EB05 fifth percentile of the confidence interval for the Empirical Bayes Geometric Mean 
 
 
 
 
In the analysis of this pilot study, the results for the names of the generic medicines as well as the 
respective equivalent proprietary products containing the five active substances were further 
investigated, represented in Figs. 6, 7 and 8, and the corresponding EB05 values summarized in 
Table 2. Each of the figures demonstrates the excess reporting rates of one of the stratification 
strategies. 
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Figure 6 Excess reporting of generic forms and corresponding Novartis products of five selected 
active pharmaceutical ingredients 
Fourteen pharmaceuticals with excess reporting rates (EB05 ≥ 2) via application of stratification 
strategy 1. Terms such as ‘valsartan 1’ refer to the 14 Novartis brand trade names and Novartis 
generic medicines identified in this study. Methylphenidate 1,4,5; carbamazepine 2, and 
rivastigmine 1 show reports with multiple MedDRA® terms. Novartis valsartan, rivastigmine, and 
clozapine are not included in this figure, as the reporting rates of these products did not meet the 
threshold (EB05 values <2). EB05 fifth percentile of the confidence interval for the Empirical 
Bayes Geometric Mean, N number of occurrences 
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Figure 7 Assessment of excess reporting of generic forms and respective Novartis equivalent of 
selected active pharmaceutical ingredients with the same substance 
Seven medicinal products with excess reporting rates (EB05 ≥ 2) via application of stratification 
strategy 2. The other seven medicinal products (Figure 6) revealed EB05 values < 2 or were not 
reported (see Table 2). The data on the y axis are shown in logarithmic form; EB05 fifth percentile 
of the confidence interval for the Empirical Bayes Geometric Mean, N number of occurrences 
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Figure 8 Country–year excess reporting of rivastigmine patch in 2 consecutive years 
Multiple MedDRA® terms were reported for the same medicinal product; EB05 fifth percentile 
of the confidence interval for the Empirical Bayes Geometric Mean, N number of occurrences 
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Table 2 Summary of identified trade names with excess reporting rates of the three stratification 
strategies on five active pharmaceutical ingredients 
Summary of identified trade names with excess reporting rates of the three stratification strategies 
on five active pharmaceutical ingredients 
Medicinal product 
Drug 
formu
-
lation 
Stratification strategy 
1: Excess reporting 
rates (EB05) relative to 
other products in the 
database for 14-year 
study perioda 
Stratification 
strategy 2: Excess 
reporting rates 
(EB05) for 
pharmaceuticals 
with the same 
substancea 
Stratification strategy 
3: Country–year 
specific excess 
reporting rates (EB05) 
Valsartan 1 Tablet 53.58 NR ND 
Valsartan 2 Tablet 3.62 2.128 
Canada 
2012: 0.23–0.99 
Methyl- 
phenidate 1 
Tablet 2.61–19.18 0.61–2.11 
Canada 
2001: 0.70–1.92 
2010: 0.34–1.20 
2011: 1.75 
Methyl- 
phenidate 2 
Tablet 7.21 4.094 
South Africa 
2004: 0.70 
2005: 0.50 
2011: 1.20 
Methyl- 
phenidate 3 
Tablet 4.85 0.6–1.49 ND 
Methyl- 
phenidate 4 
Tablet 2.6–17.2 1.14–4.40 
Denmark 
2005: 0.93–1.07 
Methyl- 
phenidate 5 
Tablet 2.8–3.8 0.24–0.84 ND 
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Summary of identified trade names with excess reporting rates of the three stratification strategies 
on five active pharmaceutical ingredients 
Medicinal product 
Drug 
formu
-
lation 
Stratification strategy 
1: Excess reporting 
rates (EB05) relative to 
other products in the 
database for 14-year 
study perioda 
Stratification 
strategy 2: Excess 
reporting rates 
(EB05) for 
pharmaceuticals 
with the same 
substancea 
Stratification strategy 
3: Country–year 
specific excess 
reporting rates (EB05) 
Methyl- 
phenidate 6 
Patch 2.15–36.51 0.3–1.53 ND 
Methyl- 
phenidate 7 
Tablet 5.08 0.13–0.77 ND 
Methyl- 
phenidate 8 
Tablet 3.75 0.07–0.97 ND 
Methyl- 
phenidate 9 
Tablet 2.63 0.05–1.13 ND 
Methyl- 
phenidate 10 
Tablet 2.22 0.02–1.60 ND 
Methyl- 
phenidate 11 
Tablet 2.03 0–0.68 ND 
Clozapine 1 Tablet 65.77 22.275 Brazil, 2011: 1.42 
Clozapine 2 Tablet 3.13 0.30–0.48 ND 
Clozapine 3 Tablet 2.89 4.332 
Canada 
2010: 1.17 
2011: 0.35 
2012: 0.39 
2013: 0.57 
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Summary of identified trade names with excess reporting rates of the three stratification strategies 
on five active pharmaceutical ingredients 
Medicinal product 
Drug 
formu
-
lation 
Stratification strategy 
1: Excess reporting 
rates (EB05) relative to 
other products in the 
database for 14-year 
study perioda 
Stratification 
strategy 2: Excess 
reporting rates 
(EB05) for 
pharmaceuticals 
with the same 
substancea 
Stratification strategy 
3: Country–year 
specific excess 
reporting rates (EB05) 
Clozapine 4b Tablet 5.30 4.32–15.0 
Italy 
2011: 0.49–0.75 
2013: 0.25–1.5 
2014: 0.92–9.06 
Carbamazepine 1 Tablet 3.27 0.86 ND 
Carbamazepine 2 Tablet 5.12–7.1 8.63–4.46 
Canada 
2003: 0.83 
2012: 0.58 
Carbamazepine 3 Tablet 4.21 0.68–0.78 ND 
Carbamazepine 4b Tablet 2.12–4.52 2.478 
Italy 
2011: 20.7 
2012: 5.36 
2013: 0.30–4.24 
2014: 2.87 
Mexico, 2014: 0.38 
Carbamazepine 5 Tablet 4.12 [0.77-1.31] ND 
Rivastigmine 1 Patch 67.90–391.05 12.16–13.1 
Netherlands 
2013: 10.8–24.74 
2014: 7.07–8.83 
EB05: fifth percentile of the confidence interval for the empirical Bayes geometric mean 
 53 
 
Summary of identified trade names with excess reporting rates of the three stratification strategies 
on five active pharmaceutical ingredients 
Medicinal product 
Drug 
formu
-
lation 
Stratification strategy 
1: Excess reporting 
rates (EB05) relative to 
other products in the 
database for 14-year 
study perioda 
Stratification 
strategy 2: Excess 
reporting rates 
(EB05) for 
pharmaceuticals 
with the same 
substancea 
Stratification strategy 
3: Country–year 
specific excess 
reporting rates (EB05) 
INN international non-proprietary name, ND not done, NR not reported 
a Ranges are used as there were reports of products with multiple MedDRA® terms. ND indicates 
that the country–year stratification was only generated when EB05 of stratification strategy 1 
and 2 was ≥2 
b Trade names could refer to INN name or to multiple generic brands 
 
We performed a literature research for advisory letters and product or batch withdrawals for 
each of the identified proprietary and generic products through official health authority and 
national pharmacovigilance center websites (independent of the MAH or manufacturer) 
concentrating on product quality issues or defects. We did not conduct a systematic review of 
all publications, as the research for advisory letters published by independent researchers or 
by the competent authorities was deemed adequate for the purposes of this study. Search terms 
included combinations of the following keywords: advisory letter, drug removal, substandard, 
quality, and trade name with country of occurrence of potential SSMs from retrospective 
analysis. Searches were limited to publications after 2001. The keywords were applied to the 
following websites: US FDA, MHRA, EMA, and selected pharmacovigilance center websites, 
e.g., Netherlands Pharmacovigilance Centre. From the resulting alerts, we extracted the 
product name, dosage form, year of the alert, and description of the product defect (4,159–
161). In addition to the literature research, we applied the three stratification strategies to two 
confirmed SSMs categorized by UMC in 2014 as confirmed SSFFC clusters (33). 
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3. Results 
 
Based on the search strategy and threshold criteria described, 2506 DECs were generated (see 
Figure 4). We excluded 664 potential target SSMs from further analysis, as the precise trade 
name of the product was not specified. The 664 excluded hits contained 478 medicinal 
products denoted as NOS, and 186 reports using generic names (e.g., fluoxetine) or broad 
therapeutic categories or drug class (e.g., ‘protectives against ultraviolet radiation for topical 
use’ or ‘centrally acting sympathomimetics’). The excluded hits could not be associated with 
a particular proprietary medicine or with a specific manufacturer if the product was a generic. 
Thus, warning letters were not applicable, as they always involved a specific medicinal 
product. 
 
In total, 23 trade names of generic and proprietary medicinal products resulted when we 
filtered the data to include only reports associated with pharmaceuticals containing valsartan, 
methylphenidate, rivastigmine, clozapine, or carbamazepine (Figure 5). Table 2 shows the 
stratification strategy results (EB05 values) of 23 proprietary and generic marketed medicines 
containing valsartan, methylphenidate, rivastigmine, clozapine, or carbamazepine. Excess 
reporting for both stratification method 1 and 2 was determined for nine medicinal products, 
whereas three pharmaceuticals (clozapine 4, carbamazepine 4, and rivastigmine 1) showed 
high EB05 values for all three data-mining operations. The three products with potential 
quality defects identified originated in Italy and the Netherlands.  
In a subset analysis, we filtered the trade names of generic medicines produced by Novartis 
and the equivalent proprietary medicines containing valsartan, methylphenidate,  rivastigmine, 
clozapine, or carbamazepine. This resulted in 21 ODRs involving 14 proprietary medicines, 
as occasionally there were reports of products with multiple MedDRA® terms (Figure 6, Figure 
7). 
 
The results of the stratification analysis are shown in Figure 6, Figure 7 and Figure 8. Figure 6 
shows excess reporting rates for all generic forms, including Novartis’ own generic products, 
valsartan and methylphenidate. The reporting rates of Novartis valsartan, rivastigmine, and 
clozapine did not meet the threshold (EB05 values <2) and are therefore not included in this 
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figure. In analogy to Figure 6, Figure 7 illustrates excess reporting rates of 7 of 14 medicinal 
products, as the EB05 value of the other seven pharmaceuticals for product substance 
stratification did not meet the threshold (EB05 <2).) The criterion for excess reporting for 
stratification analysis 1 and 2 was fulfilled for seven medicinal products, whereas the 
rivastigmine patch met all the criteria, including the country–year stratification operation 
(Figure 8). 
 
The literature search for the rivastigmine patch revealed two letters relating to quality defects 
and associated safety concerns (159,160). Details of ICSRs provided in direct health 
professional communications could be matched with specific case descriptions provided in 
the VigiBase® records, including PT, country, and year of occurrence (Figure 6). This 
medicinal product showed the highest value of EBGM and EB05 score with PT “Therapeutic 
response unexpected with drug substitution” (EBGM = 528,689; EB05 = 391,054; N = 32) 
compared with other compounds under study (Figure 7). It was evident from Vigibase® and 
the published ‘dear healthcare provider letters’ that a case series had been identified. The 
literature research for advisory letters for the other two pharmaceuticals (clozapine 4, 
carbamazepine 4), which also met all three stratification criteria was impeded because the 
identified proprietary names could refer to the international non-proprietary name (INN) or 
to multiple generic brands. No advisory letter on safety or quality was found for the other 
medicinal products under study. 
 
Two medicinal products, salbutamol and ethinyl estradiol/norgestrel combination tablets, 
were identified as confirmed SSFFC clusters by UMC in 2014 because of excess reporting 
rates. The ethinyl estradiol/norgestrel tablets were referenced in an FDA warning letter in 
2012 about a recall of 14 batches because of the possibility of inexact tablet counts or “out of 
sequence” tablets (162). In our study, this medicinal product showed ODRs that exceeded 
thresholds for stratification strategies 1 and 3. In 2012, eight reports in the USA of “product 
quality issue” with an EB05 value of 26.77 for this combination product were submitted to 
Vigibase®. 
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Quality defects, including lack of effect due to inadequate administration technique and use 
of expired products, were documented with a salbutamol solution in the USA in 2012 (33). In 
this report, the medicinal product showed ODRs that exceeded the thresholds for stratification 
strategies 1 and 3. There were 96 reports of ‘drug ineffective’ (EB05 4.5); 102 cases of 
‘product quality issue’ (EB05 20.28), and nine reports of ‘therapeutic response decreased’ 
(EB05 2.04) submitted to Vigibase®. The stratification results for both products are presented 
in Table 3 (33). 
 
Table 3 Summary of pharmaceuticals with excess reporting for all three stratification strategies 
for two confirmed substandard products 
Summary of pharmaceuticals with excess reporting for all three stratification strategies for two 
confirmed substandard products (55) 
Medicinal 
product 
Drug 
formulation 
Excess reporting 
rates (EB05) 
relative to other 
products in the 
database for 14-
year study perioda 
Excess reporting 
rates (EB05) from 
the product 
substance 
stratification 
analysis 
Excess reporting 
rates (EB05) from 
the country year 
stratification 
analysis 
Ethinyl 
estradiol and 
norgestrel 
Tablet 4.87–174.77 0.32–0.54 USA, 2012: 0.3–26.7 
Salbutamol Tablet 2.10–16.14 0.039–1.21 USA, 2012: 0.13–4.5 
aRanges are used as there were reports of products with multiple MedDRA® terms 
 
4. Discussion 
 
Our study presents a new and effective way to detect potential SSMs. The data-mining 
approach used in this pilot study resembled the method presented in the UMC Monitoring 
Medicines project (31), but we applied a different disproportionality algorithm to detect 
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potential SSMs. In the first sub-analysis, we identified active substances where reporting for 
selected PTs exceeded the threshold when compared with all other medicinal products in 
Vigibase®, whereas the Monitoring Medicines project started by selecting active substances 
within a particular country. Our second step was to evaluate disproportionality results for 
products containing the same active substance. Finally, for each medicinal product where 
reporting above the threshold occurred, we identified the country and year of occurrence. The 
UMC group analyzed the top 30 medicinal products with the highest disproportionality scores 
and assessed a further randomly selected dataset for comparison, whereas we analyzed the 
entire dataset for five active substances selected as the basis for this research and applied all 
stratification strategies on these five active substances and compared the results. The 
application of the three data-mining stratification strategies on ICSRs using the Empirica 
software discovered medicinal products with quality defects that were then confirmed by 
advisory letters from official health authority and pharmacovigilance centers. VigiBase ® 
proved to be useful reference point for the identification of clusters of potential defective 
medicines. 
 
The research presented here has augmented and extended previous work conducted by UMC 
(31,33). This study included all marketed medicines in Vigibase® based on the 24 MedDRA® 
terms indicative of product quality defects containing valsartan, methylphenidate, 
rivastigmine, clozapine, or carbamazepine. Table 2 and Table 3 illustrate that there were 
excess reporting rates (EB05 ≥ 2) for both proprietary and generic medicines. 
 
After extensive investigation of the 23 identified trade names with excess reporting rates in 
Vigibase®, one potential SSM fulfilled the criteria for all stratification strategies, and a 
product defect was confirmed via an independent report from the Pharmacovigilance Centre 
in the Netherlands (163) via distribution of two letters to healthcare professionals. In Figure 
4, Figure 5, Figure 6, Figure 7, Figure 8 and Table 2, the ODRs for the rivastigmine patch 
demonstrated high EB05 values and were demonstrable outliers. Similar to rivastigmine 1, 
the other two pharmaceuticals clozapine 4 and carbamazepine 4 also met the EB05 threshold 
for all three stratification techniques, but the literature research for advisory letters was 
hampered by the absence of specific product details. 
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The identified excess reporting rates for two of three stratification strategies on confirmed 
substandard clusters of salbutamol and ethinyl estradiol/norgestrel reinforces the potential 
utility of this data-mining approach. Compared with detection of SSMs with analytical 
devices, this technique is a non-destructive and reproducible method that can support non-
governmental centers, healthcare professionals, manufacturers, and health authorities in low- 
and middle-income countries to triage for confirmatory analysis testing of medicinal products.  
 
The findings in this study support the need for further research to refine the algorithm so this 
exploratory research becomes a matter of routine programming within the competent 
authorities and MAHs. It is our intention to optimize the sensitivity and selectivity of the 
method described. It is clear from this initial study that public health benefits could result 
from the early detection and reporting of quality defects associated with SSMs. 
 
We recognize there are limitations applicable to this systematic analysis for the detection of 
SSMs. Safety data collected by MAHs include reports of product complaints related to quality 
defects. According to the existing regulations, these two datasets (safety and quality) are 
governed rather differently, with quality under GMP and safety under Good 
Pharmacovigilance Practice (GPvP). There are multiple areas of overlap between safety and 
quality defects. For example, there is significant duplication across aggregate safety reports 
and submission of these data within periodic quality reports. Nevertheless, there are gaps in 
the analyses of these data in combination in order to form potentially important conclusions 
that may impact public health. An illustration of this is provided in Figure 9. Manufacturers 
take great care to reconcile the two datasets according to the regulations. Regulatory 
inspections often focus on this area, and this has resulted in findings (164), warning letters 
(165), and more serious sanctions (166).  
 
Our recommendation is that both regulatory authorities and MAHs could consider the 
following. 
 
• Application of this method to all medicines using large safety databases (e.g., 
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EudraVigilance) to aid the detection of adverse patient outcomes related to suspected 
SSMs. The results could help improve public health by earlier identification of 
products with quality defects.  
 
• Recommend targeted analytical testing in developing countries or regions based on the 
results of disproportionality analyses to detect SSMs. 
 
Figure 9 Inter-relationships of good manufacturing practices and good pharmacovigilance 
practices, and aggregate regulatory reports 
AE adverse event, APQR aggregate product quality reviews (including but not limited to annual 
product reviews and product quality reviews), DSUR development safety update reports (167), 
LoE lack of efficacy (168), QD quality defects, PSUR periodic safety update report, RMP risk 
management plan 
 
Juhlin et al. (33) faced the same challenges during their survey. This was a retrospective study, 
therefore we have not been able to obtain samples of the suspected SSMs for testing as they 
were no longer available. In Vigibase®, the sensitive personal health information of patients 
and the contact details for patients and primary reporters are anonymized to prevent the 
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identification of individuals (169). Consequently, it was not possible to contact the report 
sources to obtain follow-up data and thereby consolidate and potentially extend our 
preliminary findings. In addition, the majority of drugs in VigiBase® were described by their 
APIs in a non-specific manner as NOS. 
 
Under-reporting (170), particularly by resource-limited countries, meant only a relatively 
small number of ICSRs were associated with lack of efficacy events. Most of the ICSRs in 
this study originated from Europe (Italy, Netherlands, Denmark) and from Canada. Relatively 
few ICSRs originated from Brazil, Mexico, or South Africa. Healthcare professionals play a 
very important role in spontaneous reporting and, particularly in Europe, patient reporting has 
been actively promoted (170). This could be augmented by requesting that patients and 
caregivers take action to report possible quality defects and lack of efficacy. 
 
We determined there was no international consensus regarding MedDRA® terms describing 
SSMs. Initially, we started with the 24 PTs (31). In contrast, the UMC publication from 2014 
(33) included 77 PTs. We propose that the pharmaceutical industry and regulatory authorities 
collaborate with the MedDRA® Maintenance and Support Services Organization (MSSO) to 
develop a standardized MedDRA® query (SMQ) for SSMs. Perhaps the most important 
adjunct to the research described is the essential activity of conducting field-based sampling 
and testing. New portable devices will allow rapid and accurate assessment of  samples 
purchased from suppliers to further assess the viability of signals generated from the screening 
of VigiBase®. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
We have provided evidence of an effective method for the detection of SSM signals using a 
large pharmacovigilance dataset. The signal that was generated from the rivastigmine patch 
was confirmed by two independent publications in the Netherlands, both of which emanated 
from a pharmacist-based monitoring program (159,160). Furthermore, we confirmed the 
results of the data-mining technique that the ODRs for two medicinal products were related 
to SSMs as originally shown by UMC. Our findings, using this novel method of detecting 
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potential SSMs, are a positive step towards addressing the supply of poor-quality medicines. 
Further validation would enable the routine use of this approach by competent authorities and 
MAHs. 
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9 Part 2: Analytical tools for detection of SSMs 
 
Part II describes the main analytical devices currently used for the detection of SSMs. The focus 
will be on the PharmaChk technology, a portable screening instrument which allows accurate 
quantitative assessment of API. Thus, we set up a formal collaboration between Novartis Pharma 
AG, Basel and Professor Muhammad Zaman from the Biomechanical Engineering Department of 
Boston University and initiated the assay development of the essential antimalarial drug Coartem® 
on this device.   
 
Most of the time, “…low-quality medications are only detected after they harm enough patients to 
alert medical caregivers…”  (171). Hence it is difficult to identify SSMs (172) before they cause 
any harm. The complex medicine supply system and the absence of a worldwide standardized 
tracking system demands large-scale assay techniques to analyze the chemical composition of 
medicinal products (172).  
 
The detection of SSMs is currently limited to analytical technologies (147). The majority of 
published research articles on detection of poor quality medicines with analytical technologies 
comprise both falsified and SSMs. While authentication assessments are well suited to identify 
falsified medicines, the evaluation of pharmaceutical content, impurities, degradation products 
(173) and dissolution profile is substantial for reliably detecting SSMs (28,173). 
 
Routine quality testing of medicines applying pharmacopoeial analysis is costly and requires 
sophisticated equipment (27). “Pharmacopoeial requirements in countries form part of national 
legislation, defining the specifications” and standards “which pharmaceutical products circulating 
on their market must fulfil” (174)  to deliver high quality medicines (175). According to a recent 
study, as an example, the average price offered for the analysis of a single medicine sample to 
control product quality by a WHO-prequalified laboratory in South Africa was 1,580 $US (27) 
which is higher than the average monthly gross wage in South Africa (1486.19 $US in Q1 1018 
(176). Performing systematical drug screenings would therefore be a substantial cost driver. To 
protect patients globally from the use of SSMs, there is increased need for innovative field-
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applicable technologies to adequately detect low quality medicines  as soon as they appear on the 
market  (26,173,177,178). 
 Analytical technologies for medicine quality evaluation 
Medicine quality analytical technologies is based on the following four (essential) key pillars:  
 
- Verification of API identity 
- Determination of API content 
- Assessment of disintegration of the pharmaceutical formulation 
- Demonstration of dissolution of the medicine in the human body (bioavailability) 
(179,180)  
 
Generally, analytical technologies can be characterized in field and laboratory devices using a) 
destructive and b) non-destructive methods  “to ensure the identity, strength, quality, purity and 
potency of the” (181) medicinal product. Field devices are portable and rather simple to use in 
remote areas (182) whilst laboratory instruments are cumbersome, require trained personnel and 
sophisticated devices (179). Most of the laboratory devices use destructive methods and do not 
maintain the integrity of the pharmaceutical formulation whereas screening devices [e.g. handheld 
Raman spectrometer, NIR spectrometer]  allow measurements of tablets or capsules within their 
blister packaging (183,184). To date, a range of various analytical instruments are required for the 
assessment of medicines quality according to the four pillars described above (53). The following 
analytical tools represent current conventional confirmatory and screening methods (185) that are 
globally used for quality evaluation of pharmaceuticals. 
 
 Confirmatory technologies  
 
The purpose of medicine quality testing can be either for screening or for confirmatory assessment 
(186). Confirmatory technologies including HPLC, mass spectrometer (MS) and dissolution 
apparatus are costly, complex and require cumbersome repair and maintenance process. 
Consequently, there is a lack of quality assurance laboratories in developing countries. However, 
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these powerful laboratory instruments cannot be replaced by presumptive techniques such as 
Raman and NIR spectrometry as confirmatory technologies conclusively elucidate API’s identity, 
quantity and release (179).  
 
Table 4 Confirmatory laboratory technologies for quality of medicines evaluation               
NAME DESCRIPTION VARIATIONS  ADVANTAGES DISADVANTAGES 
*HPLC Separation technique that 
involves a solid stationary 
phase and a liquid mobile 
phase. „Separation of the 
components of a solution 
results from the difference in 
the relative distribution ratios 
of the solutes between the two 
phases.“ (187) 
-HPLC-MS 
-Ultra-
performance 
liquid 
chromatography 
(UPLC) 
-Reverse-phase 
liquid 
chromatography 
(RP-LC) 
-High sensitivity 
(188)  
-Precise content   
 determination 
-Non-portable (189) 
-Cumbersome 
maintenance (189)  
-High 
instrumentation costs 
(190) 
-Qualified staff needs 
to prepare the 
samples in a well-
equipped laboratory 
requiring delicate 
solvents and reagents 
(188)  
*Gas 
chromatography 
(GC) 
Separation technique that 
involves a solid stationary 
phase which is a high boiling 
point liquid coating absorbed 
on the surface of a granular 
solid in a column and a mobile 
phase which is an inert gas 
(187,191).   
-GC coupled to 
a flame 
ionization 
detector (GC-
FID) 
-GC-MS 
*Mass 
spectrometry 
(MS) 
„MS utilizes the degree of 
deflection of charged particles 
by a magnetic field to find the 
relative masses of molecular 
ions and fragments“ (192) 
-Direct analysis 
in real time 
(DART) 
-Desorption 
electrospray 
ionization 
(DESI) 
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NAME DESCRIPTION VARIATIONS  ADVANTAGES DISADVANTAGES 
Ultraviolet (UV) 
spectrometry  
UV spectrometry “involves 
measuring the amount of 
ultraviolet or visible radiation 
absorbed by a substance in 
solution” (193). This method is 
used to characterize the 
chemical composition of 
medicine samples, confirms 
the identification of a 
substance through comparison 
with a reference spectrum 
(194) and evaluates the purity 
of medicine samples (195) 
-HPLC-UV 
-CE-UV 
-Simple and fast 
and reveals a 
moderate 
specificity (193) 
-Not portable  
-Requires 
experienced 
personnel (53) 
Capillary 
electrophoresis 
(CE)  
Separation technique that 
separates molecules in an 
electric field according to size 
and charge. This technique is 
performed in a capillary that is 
filled with an electrolyte 
solution  (196). CE technology 
can be applied for qualitative 
and quantitative determination 
of medicine samples (53) 
CE-UV -Requires only 
little training  
-Cheap analysis 
cost (53) 
-Relies on a high 
electric field (issue in 
emerging countries) 
(53) 
+Disintegration The disintegration apparatus 
determines whether solid 
formulations “disintegrate 
within the prescribed time 
when placed in a liquid 
medium” (187)  
 
/ Both tools are 
easy to operate 
and robust (197) 
-Fixed volume of 
medium aggravates 
testing of poorly 
soluble medicines 
(198) 
 
+Dissolution The dissolution apparatus, 
“used as bioavailability 
indicator” (101) routinely 
performs QC tests (199,200) to 
“determine the amount of 
API(s) released from solid 
dosage forms, using a known 
volume of dissolution medium 
within a predetermined length 
of time (201). This analytical 
test represents a conclusive 
assessment as it can identify 
SSMs including the declared 
Paddle and 
basket 
dissolution 
-Simulation of 
gastrointestinal 
transit conditions is 
not easily possible 
with current 
dissolution 
techniques (197) 
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NAME DESCRIPTION VARIATIONS  ADVANTAGES DISADVANTAGES 
API content (202)  but altered 
dissolution profile (14) 
*Gold standard for verification, purity, quantification of many pharmaceutical substances (22,192, 217). 
+ Physical analysis tests (101) including dissolution or disintegration test requirements are critical (204) for the 
characterization of the quality and performance of medicinal products (205). 
 
 Screening technologies 
 
Qualitative and/or quantitative technologies” (206) (e.g. Raman spectrometry, TLC Minilab®) 
allow rapid analysis (207) of large volumes of pharmaceuticals “for preliminary identification of 
suspect medical products in the field” (206) but bear the risk of false positives (207). “They can 
only establish the possibility that a particular pharmaceutical compound is present…” (207). 
Hence, instruments (such as Raman or NIR spectrometer) can be effectively applied to narrow 
down the number of medicinal samples that will undergo confirmatory testing. In low and middle-
income countries (LMIC) these instruments constitute the initial step of medicine quality 
assessment (179). 
Table 5 Screening technologies for medicine quality assessment 
NAME DESCRIPTION ADVANTAGES DISADVANTAGES 
Visual 
inspection 
Visual inspection (printing, embossing, shape, 
odor, taste, consistency) represents the first  (14) 
step for required medicines quality evaluation 
(173,185)  
-Cheap 
-Can be used in-
field setting 
 
-Due to the lack of 
sensitivity and speci-
ficity (14) performing 
this analysis alone” 
(101) is not adequate to 
assess drug quality 
(173) 
Handheld 
refractometer 
Handheld refractometer can be used to measure 
the refractive index which determines the purity 
of liquids and solid substances. It further serves 
to quantify some APIs (173) 
 
-Allows rapid 
analysis 
-Ease of use 
-Relatively low 
cost (208) 
-Dispersion (seen as 
blurring and coloring of 
the border-line 
-Limited accuracy and 
precision due to the size 
and optical 
arrangement.  
-No control over the 
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NAME DESCRIPTION ADVANTAGES DISADVANTAGES 
sample temperature 
(209) 
Counterfeit 
Detection 
Device #3 
(CD3)  
This device evaluates the packaging material 
(primary and secondary packaging, and 
labelling) and packaging print. The dosage units 
(tablets, powders) are visually examined at 
specific wavelengths of light to determine if the 
observed images are consistent or not consistent 
with the library images of the authentic medicinal 
products which is pass or fail (185,210). 
-Relatively cheap 
-Very effective in 
identifying 
differences in 
strength of a given 
product and the 
capability to 
identify SSMs 
(185) 
-„Results are user 
dependent” 
-Can only compare to 
the images it owns in 
the library otherwise 
there is no analysis 
possible (185) 
Thin layer 
chromato-
graphy (TLC) 
TLC is a semi quantitative separation technique. 
The stationary phase is a polar absorbent, usually 
finely ground alumina or silica particles.  This 
absorbent. Since different substances are moving 
up the Thin-Layer Chromatography plate at 
different rates, they can be separated, identified 
and analyzed (211–213). 
-Relatively cheap 
(179) 
-Simple (214) 
-Cannot assess the 
exact amount of API 
content of medicine 
samples (101) 
TLC Minilab® Gold standard field-based screening technique 
(215) performs semi-quantitative TLC and 
disintegration testing to assess the identity, 
release and estimate the concentration of APIs 
(26,216,217) 
-Portable (183) 
-Affordable  
-Acquires high 
samples 
throughput (218) 
-“Competent, well 
trained users are 
required to obtain 
reliable results” (185)  
In addition, as this 
instrument applies a 
semi-quantitative 
method, it can reliably 
identify only grossly 
SSMs and should 
therefore not be used as 
an independent testing 
resource (218) 
Paper 
chromato-
graphy test 
card 
Qualitative method which is designed to identify 
the API(s) as well as binders and fillers used in 
tablets and capsules such as chalk, talc and starch 
(219). “The test card consists of 12 lanes 
containing different reagents. The reactions of 
the reagents with the rising water in each lane 
generate colors to form a "color bar code" which 
can be analyzed visually by comparison with 
standard outcomes. 
-Inexpensive 
-Fast analysis 
(219) 
-Poor quantification of 
the API(s)  
-Due to the low 
specifity of this assay, 
false-positive results 
may be obtained (53) 
aNIR 
spectrometry 
Fingerprinting identity test measures the Raman 
or NIR spectra of the medicinal sample and 
-High accuracy 
(177) 
-Not quantitative 
results 
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NAME DESCRIPTION ADVANTAGES DISADVANTAGES 
aRaman compare it to the respective reference spectrum 
in the library” (183,185) 
-Nondestructive 
methods 
-Requires no 
sample 
preparation for 
testing a high 
throughput of 
medicinal samples 
(177) [analysis 
time 30 seconds] 
which appears as 
Fail/Pass results 
on the display of 
these instruments 
-Relatively high 
instrumentation cost 
(183,185) 
-Inadequate for 
detecting SSMs 
(185,220,221) 
a Nuclear 
magnetic 
resonance 
spectroscopy 
(NMR) 
NMR spectroscopy detects the chemical 
environment of atomic nuclei by the absorption 
of radio-frequency electromagnetic radiation 
when in the presence of a high magnetic field 
(222) 
-Quantitative 
analysis 
-Not destructive 
(223) 
-Requires presence of 
high-magnetic-field 
environment 
- Very high 
instrumentation costs 
(224) 
a Spectrometer techniques determine the overall composition of a drug product” (183,204) 
9.1.2.1 Quantitative screening device under development 
All screening tools described above mainly perform qualitative and semi-quantitative analysis of 
medicinal samples (225) (22). Currently the TLC Minilab® (Table 5) is the gold standard screening 
device for medicines quality evaluation and highly eligible for detecting falsified pharmaceuticals 
(215). Indeed the detection of SSMs requires the evaluation of pharmaceutical content, impurities, 
degradation products (173) and dissolution profile (28,173) . Presently, “no existing field 
technology is capable of reliable API quantification and kinetic release analysis” (215).  
Nevertheless, since 2014 there have been efforts from the Biomechanical Engineering department 
of BU to develop a portable screening technology (226), PharmaChk, which combines the 
attributes of assessing the exact API dosage and the dissolution profile of solid and liquid 
formulations (215). 
 
The PharmaChk device is a field-based quality screening tool (215) with a high specificity 
enabling a fast quantitative assessment of drug ingredients (225). This instrument combines a 
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fluorescent or luminescent assay and microfluidic technology (29). Before being able to assess the 
API content of a medicinal sample, the PharmaChk instrument needs to be calibrated for the API 
of interest. 
 
The determination of API concentration using the PharmaChk device is as follows (Figure 10): 
The tablet is dissolved in the tablet dissolver and is then pumped into the microfluidic chip where 
it is mixed with the fluorescent probe solution (29). The interaction of a specific probe with the 
API of interest in the reaction chamber generates a luminescent signal, that is captured by the 
charge coupled device (CCD) camera, and which reflects the quantity of the API of interest 
(29,189). 
 
Figure 10 Assessment of API concentration using the PharmaChk instrument (29) 
 
The PharmaChk screening instrument has several advantages. It accurately and specifically 
determines the content of the stated API(s) (in percentage) as well as the kinetic release 
(dissolution profile) of liquid and solid formulations (29,215,225). It further allows a relatively 
high throughput of samples, as the turnaround time for analysis of 1 sample amounts to 15 minutes 
Fluorescent 
probe solution 
Reaction 
chamber 
Charge Coupled Device (CCD)  
camera detector  
Dissolved 
tablet 
Tablet dissolver 
Microfluidic chip 
Mixing chamber 
Fluorescent intensity 
Assessment of API 
concentration 
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(171,225,227). This device “holds promise as a user-friendly, affordable (price estimate ~1,000 
$US) and portable (~10-12 lbs suitcase) instrument for a quick evaluation of quality of medicines 
that can be used in the field. Pilot studies in Ghana and several locations in Asia have shown 
comparable results to gold standard HPLC (within 5%) (225). Limitations of the PharmaChk 
device are a) that the medicinal sample is destroyed under investigation and b) reagents are 
required for sample preparation (173). Due to the high specificity of PharmaChk technology, the 
probe and reference samples are necessary for every compound that will be tested. At present, 
assays for precise quantification of tetracycline and artesunate have been developed. Thus the 
development of an on-board reference database to facilitate high-throughput field testing of a broad 
variety of pharmaceuticals is required (228). According to Prof. Zaman, in the near future this 
instrument will also allow the quantification of excipients impurities and/or degradation products 
(229) for drugs of interest and therefore represent a well-suited screening device for reliably 
identifying SSMs.   
 
After describing the relevant screening and confirmatory technologies commonly used for 
assessing medicines quality, in the next section there is focus on the use of the above mentioned 
devices to specifically identify SSMs.  
 Suggested analytical technologies for detection of SSMs 
The review article of Kovacs et al. (26) reported the availability of 42 unique technologies in 2014 
on detection of falsified and SSMs. In order to classify substandard and falsified medicines, the 
Counterfeit Drug Forensic Investigation Network (CODFIN) (230) developed a systematic 
analytical workflow which has been used by several research groups to investigate malarial drug 
quality in developing countries (173). To evaluate the presence and content of the API (26), this 
workflow suggests packaging inspection, followed by colorimetric testing, spectroscopic methods 
including Raman and NIR and quantitative HPLC. For further determination of the substandard 
nature of a medicinal product, dissolution testing to determine the bioavailability as well as MS 
analysis to identify the sample ingredients, are envisaged. To identify the geographic source of the 
manufacturing site in confirmed cases of falsified medicines, analysis on elemental composition 
(profile of trace metals (183) with XRF, identification of excipients by isotope ratio MS (IRMS), 
X-ray diffraction (XRD) and NMR can be conducted (26).  
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In August 2017 the WHO published a draft guidance document on testing of “suspect” falsified 
medicines (231), however there is no guidance document on using analytical instrument for 
identifying SSMs. This working document describes the workflow on laboratory analysis of 
medicinal samples and presents examples of analytical techniques that may be used for package 
identification, screening and testing of suspected SSFFC products. In addition detailed guidance 
is provided concerning sampling of medicinal products and reporting of testing results. At the very 
beginning of this document “suspect” medicines are classified in three categories: The first 
category represents substandard medicines, the second unregistered/unlicensed medicines and the 
third category are falsified medicines. The guidance document clearly states that it focuses 
particularly on medicinal products of the third category, the falsified medicines (231). In the 
workflow description on laboratory analysis, only packaging analysis, including Raman or 
Fourier-transform infrared spectroscopy are used as screening technologies for medicines quality 
testing.  
 
Based on literature research in the field of defective medicines, the following figure intends to 
present the most commonly used analytical technologies for the detection of SSMs (182). In 
addition  ¸[Figure 11] includes the screening instruments which are currently under development.  
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Figure 11 Overview on currently and commonly used analytical methods for detection of SSMs 
 
 
* Non-invasive methods. All other presented laboratory and field devices use invasive methods.  
a Analytical technologies under development 
 Discussion 
Analytical technologies for the assessment of quality of medicines is a fast moving field (26). The 
workflow developed by CODFIN (230) represents a first useful approach on identifying SSMs 
with analytical instruments.  Other existing guidelines such as “WHO draft guidance on testing of 
“suspect” falsified medicines” (231) and the “Council of Europe: Testing of counterfeit/illegal 
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medicines” (232) clearly specifically deal with identifying falsified medicines and do not include 
SSMs.  Notwithstanding, inclusion of to date field screening technologies in the CODFIN 
workflow is necessary. Relating to detection of SSMs, the PharmaChk device would be an 
essential add-on as quantitative screening instrument along with the existing qualitative screening 
devices Raman and NIR spectrometer in order to obtain a comprehensive picture of collected 
substandard medicine samples (233). In order to implement its worldwide application as a global 
standard (routine) workflow for medicines quality surveillance programs, further validation of 
these workflows is required. Before designating PharmaChk as a quantitative screening tool in the 
CODFIN workflow, more field studies need to be conducted.  
 
Current variety of screening and confirmatory techniques allow post market surveillance and help 
to decrease the prevalence of poor-quality pharmaceuticals in the global supply chain (171). 
However, no ideal device has yet been identified to provide reliable results on identification, 
quantification, disintegration and dissolution profile of SSMs and fulfilling a range of desired 
criteria : 
 
• Sturdy and durable (173) 
• Low-cost (affordable) 
• Easy-to-use (not requiring specific training) 
• Sustainable (particular in hot and humid climates) 
• Easy portability 
• No sample preparation (no reagents required) 
• Non-destructive method 
• Fast analysis (high throughput of samples)   
• Easy and affordable to be repaired and maintained locally    
 
In  respect of the present confirmatory technologies, at least two techniques have to be combined 
(e.g. HPLC and dissolution apparatus) to confirm conclusively the substandard nature of a 
medicinal sample.  
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At the time of my evaluation it became apparent that there are far more laboratory instruments 
available for detection of SSMs than field devices (Figure 11). Hence this reveals the lack of 
appropriate, easy to use and affordable technologies for rapid identification of SSMs in resource 
limited countries. In addition this fact further impedes the fight in the trade of these medicines 
(234). A wider use of appropriate field instruments may considerably support medicines quality 
assurance preeminently through a pre-selection process which would help to reduce the number of 
pharmaceuticals that require further confirmatory testing and could result in a significant reduction 
of analysis costs. An increased use of screening devices would provide the possibility to perform 
high throughput testing of medicine samples worldwide which in turn could lead to more accurate 
prevalence data in the global supply chain (171) on SSMs in various therapeutic areas (218). Thus 
neither device is entirely fit for purpose.  
Presently there are mainly two established field screening tools that can be used for detection of 
SSMs: the CD3 and the TLC-Minilab®. The CD3 allows the comprehensive analysis of the 
packaging material whereas the TLC-Minilab concedes identity and disintegration but only 
provides semi- quantitative content assessments (185). However both instruments lack the ability 
of precise determination of the pharmaceutical content and the dissolution profile which is 
considered essential for proper analytical identification of SSMs (173). 
In contrast to CD3 and the TLC-Minilab®, the portable PharmaChk device, which is currently 
under development, allows accurate determination of the pharmaceutical content and the 
dissolution profile. As both criteria for medicines quality assurance are substantial for reliably 
detecting SSMs (28,173), the PharmaChk device is best suited as it provides precise estimates for 
both analysis tests. In addition this instrument represents a simple and affordable screening method 
allowing a rapid monitoring of drug quality in circumstances where gold standard methods (more 
advanced laboratory techniques) may not be available (235). Overall, the PharmaChk is a compact 
screening device and can fill the apparent gap regarding analytical screening devices for detection 
of SSMs. 
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 Substudy: PharmaChk assay development for Coartem® 
After thorough investigation of commonly used analytical technologies for detection of SSMs, we 
fully recognized  the essential need for research on the domain of portable screening tools. We 
were interested to gain more insight into the PharmaChk technique as this is the only available 
portable screening device that adheres to three of the four essential pillars for quality assurance of 
medicines (Verification of API identity, determination of API content and assessment of 
disintegration of the pharmaceutical formulation) and we wanted to explore its application in 
practice (Chapter 10.1). 
In January 2015 cooperation between Novartis Pharma AG and the Biomechanical Engineering 
research laboratory of BU on the PharmaChk device was initiated (236). Antimalarials are the 
most researched group of defective medicines; it has been concluded that over 100,000 preventable 
deaths annually may be attributed to the consumption of substandard therapies (227).  
Coartem® (a fixed combination medicine of artemether and lumefantrine) (30) was selected as the 
first target which represents the primary treatment for uncomplicated malaria in many countries 
with significant endemicity of this disease (237).  
Early research on tetracycline (28) and artesunate (238) had shown the potential utility of the 
PharmaChk device, but it had not been validated on coartemether medicines. In the last three years 
the research laboratory of BU has developed an assay to specifically and sensitively identify the 
dose of artemether and lumefantrine in a given drug tablet (239). They isolated DNA aptamers 
with high affinity to the above mentioned drug substances and modified them with fluorophores 
to create 'aptasensors' which were integrated into the PharmaChk system for user-friendly 
determination of drug quality. In order to ensure that the selected aptamers were specific to the 
above mentioned drug substances (as opposed to excipients or degradation products), pure, high 
quality drug substance references were essential to the validation process. Whole tablets of genuine 
Coartem® were utilized as reference standards to evaluate how tablet API and excipients interact 
during the drug detection process. The PharmaChk assay showed accurate quantification of both 
APIs using absorbance. Blind tests of both APIs demonstrated accurate content quantification 
compared to reference samples. In addition to the evaluation of API content, the BU team further 
worked on revealing the dissolution profile of the APIs. In addition, the PharmaChk was tested 
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and further validated as screening tool for Coartem® by evaluating the quality of antimalarial 
samples from Zimbabwe. The research study is presented and discussed in detail in part 3 below. 
The development of Coartem® assay on the PharmaChk device has added to the existing reference 
library of APIs on the instrument including tetracycline and artesunate (28,238). For the first time 
a combination drug was tested on the PharmaChk technology. Scientific research by BU made it 
possible to simultaneously assess the content of both APIs (artemether and lumefantrine).  
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10 Part 3: Quality assessment of anti-malarial fixed-dose combination tablets 
in Zimbabwe: Use of different screening and confirmatory analytical 
technologies  
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 Introduction 
In Part 1 and 2 of this research  methods to identify SSMs were described. The most important 
adjunct to the aforementioned research outlined in part 1 and 2 was the essential activity of 
conducting field-based sampling and testing. The aim was to attain rapid and accurate assessment 
of medicine samples purchased from various suppliers and different sources in a field-based 
sampling approach to further assess the viability of signals generated from the screening of 
VigiBase®. The focus was on antimalarial medicines in Africa, where it is strongly suspected that 
SSMs are in circulation and are available from multiple unknown sources. This offers a significant 
threat to public health, and thus demanded further investigation. We chose the essential medicine 
Coartem® (30) as it represents the primary treatment for uncomplicated malaria in many African 
countries (237). Data mining analysis using Vigibase® data for the time period 1998-2017 on 
Coartem® revealed no excess reporting rates (EB05>2) relative to other products in the database. 
Although the compound has been commercially available since 1998, there have been only 555 
reports of AEs from 1998-2017. 
 
We decided to perform a research study in Zimbabwe as there have been reports of substandard 
and falsified medicines (240). Moreover, since 2007-2017, no quality studies of medicines were 
conducted in Zimbabwe. This research project is the first quality study in Zimbabwe that has been 
performed on Coartem® and its generic versions (241).  
 
The overall goal of this cooperation between academic and private laboratory institution and the 
pharmaceutical industry was to validate a portable screening tool that could help MOH and HCPs 
to control and ensure access of good quality medicines to patients. In this part of the thesis the 
suitability of this device was assessed on purchased samples containing coartemether from 
Zimbabwe to test its capability and functions compared to gold- standard technology, HPLC.  
 Background 
In March 2015, the department of Patient Safety at Novartis Pharma AG established a cooperation 
with the African Institute of Biomedical Science & Technology (AiBST) in Zimbabwe. This 
institution is specialized in forensic toxicology and is the only approved institution in Zimbabwe 
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for DNA testing (242). As the problem of substandard and counterfeit medicines is a persisting 
threat in this country, Professor Collen Masimirembwa is “determined to tackle this growing 
challenge” (206) and to develop his institution to the laboratory of excellence in this field. This 
institution had no previous experience in detection of substandard and falsified medicines. 
 
 Malaria in Zimbabwe 
 
In 2016, there were 216 million estimated malaria cases (95% confidence interval [CI]: 
196–263 million) worldwide (243) and 445,000 malaria deaths according to World Malaria Report 
2017 (244). Malaria transmission affected 91 of 196 countries worldwide in 2015 (245). Sub-
Saharan Africa was the most affected region with 90% of malaria cases and 92% of deaths 
predominantly in children under five years (245). The malaria parasites causing the biggest malaria 
threat are P. falciparum (most prevalent in Africa, leading to most malaria deaths) and P.vivax 
which are the most common species outside of Sub-Saharan region.     
 
Malaria in the sub-Saharan country Zimbabwe represents a major health burden with 50% of the 
population being at risk (8,000,000 people) specifically in the northern and eastern areas bordering 
Mozambique and Zambia (34) [Figure 12]. Out of the 62 country districts´, 33 are categorized as 
high burden malaria areas. Plasmodium falciparum is the main cause of this infectious disease in 
this region (34). According to the WHO, there are more than 400,000 malaria cases (246) each 
year which makes malaria the third leading cause of illness and mortality in this country after 
AIDS and Tuberculosis (247). In 2013, 535,931 confirmed cases and 406 confirmed deaths were 
reported (247,248). Considering the 2012 Malaria Indicator Survey, the prevalence of this disease 
was 0.4% in Zimbabwe (249). Additionally according to the map of malaria cases reported in 
2015, Zimbabwe showed “insufficiently consistent data to assess trends” (250).     
 
Figure 12 Annual Malaria Incidence Rates by District in Zimbabwe in 2016 (251)  
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The epidemiology of this seasonal disease differs throughout the country and varies by altitude 
[Figure 12]. There is year round transmission in the lowland areas (<700m) whereas the incidence 
in the highland areas (>1200m) is very low. The  transmission time for malaria occurs mainly 
during the rainy season from November until April, with a peak  occurring from February to April 
(252).  
Preventive measures to tackle malaria in Zimbabwe are covering high burden disease areas with 
insecticide-treated nets as well as indoor residual spraying and control of malaria in pregnancy 
with sulfadoxine-pyrimethamine (249). Guidelines for management of malaria in Zimbabwe of 
December 2009 recommend the use of the combination therapy artemether-lumefantrine 
(coartemether) as first line treatment of simple uncomplicated malaria (247,253).  
 
In 2009, Zimbabwe was selected as one of the Malaria Elimination 8 (E8) countries in the Southern 
Africa pursuing the ambitious goal “to reduce malaria incidence from 22/1000 persons in 2012 to 
10/1000 persons by 2017 and malaria deaths to near zero by 2017” (249,254). According to WHO 
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Malaria report 2015, Zimbabwe belongs to the countries with low transmission in Southern Africa 
(248). In addition the WHO confirmed that in 2014 “South Africa and Zimbabwe delivered 
sufficient antimalarial medicines to treat more than 80% of malaria cases attending public health 
facilities”. Since 2011 the burden of malaria in Zimbabwe has declined due to early and improved 
malaria diagnosis as well as effective antimalarial treatment. From 2000-2015 the admission and 
mortality rates decreased by more than 75% (255) (248). Although decreasing incidence rates have 
been  seen since 2000s, the malaria burden persists in the Northern and Eastern regions of the 
country, predominantly at the borders to the neighboring countries Mozambique and Zambia. 
 
Malarious regions in Zimbabwe 
The Republic of Zimbabwe consists of 10 provinces and 63 rural districts. About 70% of the 
population lives in rural areas (256). More than 50% of the rural districts are considered to be 
malarious; 30 of these districts are high risk areas and 16 are considered to be pre-elimination areas  
(249).  
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Figure 13 Provinces and neighbouring borders of Zimbabwe (257) 
 
 
 
Zimbabwe District Health Information System 2 (DHIS2) data from 2015 revealed that about  83% 
of the malaria cases and 61% of the deaths caused by malaria occurred in sustained high burden 
areas situated along the Zimbabwe-Mozambique border: Manicaland with 33%, Mashonaland 
Central with 15% and Mashonaland East with 14% of the malaria deaths (252). Manicaland 
province was the area with the highest number of all malaria cases in this country (42%) (249,258).  
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 Health care system in Zimbabwe 
 
The health care system in Zimbabwe is divided into public, private (259,260) and traditional 
sectors. The public sector which again is divided in national, provincial, district and primary/rural 
levels, represents the “major provider of health services” and consists of Ministry of Health and 
child care, local government and mission hospitals. The Zimbabwean government owns about 70% 
of the healthcare facilities, whereas the private sector owns about 30%. Most of the population 
uses state and mission hospitals and clinics which are less expensive (261). In 2008, 65% of health 
care services were provided by the public sector in Zimbabwe (262). 
 
According to data compiled by the Community Working Group on Health (CWGH), the 
government spent 6% of its 4.1 billion $US national budget on public health in 2015. This budget 
allocation remains below the agreed target set by the African union (Abuja Declaration’s goal of 
2001) of 15% of the country’s total budget to the health sector (263). The majority of the 
population in Zimbabwe cannot afford basic health care services (264).  
 
The Zimbabwean government tends to favor budget allocations to the two wealthiest cities, Harare 
and Bulawayo. This is reflected by the number of health care facilities in these two cities (265). 
The capital Harare (population 2,123,132) comprises 50% of the health care facilities of Zimbabwe 
including 246 registered pharmacies, 9 hospital pharmacies and 54 industrial clinics. In total there 
are 538 pharmacies, 16 hospital pharmacies and 190 industrial clinics in Zimbabwe. Due to the 
relatively unstable economic situation in the country and an unemployment rate of 70% in 2013, 
the number of informal drug retail outlets (266) is increasing (267). 
 
Less than 1% of the population in Zimbabwe (16,813,229 inhabitants) (268) can afford health 
insurance. The government health insurance covers health care for military, military veterans, 
teachers, government employees, health care workers, and individuals living in extreme poverty. 
In addition employer based and private health insurances as well as company-provided health 
insurance (for employees of mining companies and large agriculture companies) do exist (265).  
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 Affordability of medicines and access to patients 
 
In the last 20 years the Zimbabwean health care system has faced many political, social and 
economic challenges but it has recovered during the last five years (269,270). However, the current 
economic situation of the country (due to hyperinflation and “dollarization” (265)) is not strong 
enough to support all public health needs. Many health workers went abroad for better positions 
and salaries, which has led to severe human resource shortages in the public health care system 
(265). The weak economic situation in Zimbabwe has led to stock-outs of essential medicines, 
medical supplies, infrastructure, and a reliance on donor-supported programs particularly for 
infectious diseases including malaria and AIDS. The majority of the health initiatives are funded 
by various international donors such as Global fund, UNICEF (271). The Zimbabwe National Drug 
Policy has still not achieved its goal of 90% availability of essential medicines (e.g. amoxicillin, 
ciprofloxacin) in the country (272). Medication prices are relatively high in Zimbabwe and impede 
the accessibility of medicines to patients with low incomes (272). The latest survey on medicine 
prices in Zimbabwe in 2005 applied by the WHO/HAI (Health Action International) concluded 
that there were considerable price increases from manufacturer to wholesaler and finally to the 
patient. There was a markup of 40% from the wholesaler adding up to 50% for import, insurance 
and freight fees (273). 
 
There is also a considerable price discrepancy between the public and private sector (273), with 
the costs of some generic medicines 22.3% higher than those in state hospitals (272). As an 
example “the lowest paid government worker would need 4.5 days̕ wages to purchase asthma 
treatment in the private sector versus 3 days to get generic medicines for asthma in the public 
sector” (273). Gavaza et al. revealed (272) that dispensing doctors from the private health care 
facilities in Zimbabwe charged the highest prices whereas the public hospitals charged the lowest 
prices for the medicines investigated in the study. In addition the price of innovator brands was 
three times as expensive as the cost of generic versions purchased in the private sector (272).  
The dilemma is, that not all medicines can be accessed in the public sector, so patients have to go 
to private health care facilities to obtain the required medication (272).   
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 Manufacturing of medicines in Zimbabwe 
 
According to MCAZ (registered health care facilities in 2015) there are 13 licensed pharmaceutical 
manufacturers approved by Zimbabwe government that are GMP certified out of which only one 
meets the WHO prequalification requirements (274). The domestic manufacturers cover about 
50% of the essential medicines  (259). The acceptance of generic medicines is very high on the 
pharmaceutical market in Zimbabwe. This is reflected by the number of prescriptions as well as 
the amount of medicines imported to the country, mainly from India. According to the price survey 
from 2005, generic imported drugs are cheaper than the local manufactured medicines. The results 
of this survey showed that from 43 investigated medicines, no innovator branded medicinal 
product was available in the supply chain of this country, meaning that all medications had to be 
imported.   
 
First line treatment for uncomplicated malaria is the fixed-combination drug artemether-
lumefantrine (coartemether). Currently there is no local manufacturer for this medicinal product 
in Zimbabwe (273). All registered  versions of coartemether medicines (excluding Coartem® which 
is the innovator brand) are generic medicines imported from India.   
 
 Substandard and falsified medicines in Zimbabwe 
 
A comprehensive review of the literature has revealed a high risk of availability of substandard 
and counterfeit medicines in pharmacies, hospitals and drug outlets in Zimbabwe (37,249). The 
prevalence of substandard/falsified medicines in this country is estimated to be between 11-44% 
(median 28.5%) (275). This figure represents a very broad range probably due to the presence of 
only a limited number of studies on the quality of medicines and potency assessments in the last 
30 years. However none of these studies used random sampling and therefore the actual prevalence 
of falsified and SSMs is unknown (6). All of these studies illustrated below (Figure 14) show the 
circulation of poor quality medicines in this country.  
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Figure 14 Summary of studies on medicines quality and potency assessments in Zimbabwe 
 
 
While there are few prevalence surveys on SSMs in Zimbabwe since 1988 (Figure 14), these only 
analyzed limited product characteristics such as content API% and dissolution rate (DR) (276).  
 
The first field study to investigate the presence of SSMs in Zimbabwe was performed in 1988. The 
parenteral ergometrine medication was intended to prevent maternal death due to post-partum 
haemorrhage. It turned out that the potency of parenteral ergometrine was severely affected by 
storage at ambient temperatures in tropical countries instead of being stored under refrigeration 
[between 2°C and 8°C] (36) (277). In 1998, another trial on 13 essential medicines concluded that 
medicinal products instability (due to storage of transport) was rare and that poor initial quality 
poses a much more serious problem (278). In 2003, a pilot study on quality of antimalarials was 
performed in Zimbabwe and seven other African countries. The study revealed significant content 
failure for chloroquine tablets as well as problems with the dissolution rate of 
sulphadoxine/pyrimethamine (279). The survey on quality of antiretroviral medicines in 2007 also 
revealed the presence of substandard or falsified antiretroviral medicines in Zimbabwe (280). 
 
In Zimbabwe, the first antimalarial drug resistance cases were reported in 1984 (35). The 
infiltration of poor quality medicines containing subtherapeutic concentrations of the Zimbabwean 
 87 
 
market may contribute to the development of antimicrobial resistance (6). There is not enough 
field evidence available but SSMs with reduced API content or bioavailability, resulting in low 
drug levels are suspected to be a relevant driver for development of drug resistance and failure of 
efficacy and may “thereby lead to the wider spread of” malaria (4). Drug levels in the blood are 
the key variable for determining patient outcome and resistance to most infectious diseases (281). 
 Aims and objectives 
At the present time there is paucity of research on the quality of locally available antimalarial 
medicines (282) in Zimbabwe “…where the market for antimalarials is substantial…” (282). This 
research project aimed to cover a selected cross-section of the country’s registered and potentially 
illicit medication distribution channels and to assess the quality of the essential antimalarial drug 
Coartem® and its generic versions in the private health sector in Zimbabwe. The secondary 
objective was to evaluate the accuracy of the PharmaChk device in a real-world setting regarding 
quantification of artemether and lumefantrine content compared to state of the art technologies. 
The tertiary objective was to build laboratory capacity in Harare in collaboration with AiBST to 
identify substandard and falsified antimalarials.   
 
The “association between health care costs and quality is one of the more controversial topics in 
health policy” (283). The exploratory objective of this survey was to investigate the price of 
Coartem® and its generic versions in order to determine if there is an association between the cost 
of medicines and medicines quality. In public health care facilities the fixed-dose combination 
medicine of Coartem® is provided for free to the patients. In addition, this study intended to build 
up laboratory capacity to support the Medicines Control Authority of Zimbabwe (MCAZ) to detect 
poor quality medicines. According to the current President and Chief Medical Officer, Professor 
Collen Masimirembwa of AiBST, there has been no similar study conducted on coartemether 
medicines in Zimbabwe, so far.  
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 Ethical approval and permissions 
The legal framework for this research study was agreed upon by all participating parties. The 
approval to conduct this study in Zimbabwe was requested from AiBST director Prof. 
Masimirembwa and obtained from MCAZ in September 2016. 
 Material and methods 
The study was carried out in malaria-endemic areas of Zimbabwe to study the quality of 
coartemether medicines using different screening and confirmatory technologies in order to 
classify the purchased samples in good quality, substandard and falsified. This research study 
targeted the six approved coartemether medicines in Zimbabwe for uncomplicated malaria 
including Coartem®, Artefan, Combiart, Lumartem and Lumither in 20/120 mg tablets and 
Komefan in both 20/120mg and 40/240mg (MCAZ registered medicines 2016). The medicine 
samples were purchased from retail and hospital pharmacies and the informal market of the private 
sector. 
 Study activities overview 
 
Coartem® and its generic versions were purchased  by mystery shoppers between 6-14. Feb 2017 
from 16 cities throughout Zimbabwe and between 28. March - 3. April 2017 from Harare and 
Chitungwiza and delivered to the analysis laboratory in Harare. Purchase locations included retail 
pharmacies and hospitals from the private sector and unlicensed drug outlets. The selected 
timeframe of the sample collection coincided with the peak malaria transmission season (249). 
During the sample collection timeframe from February until April 2017, heavy rain falls in 
Zimbabwe lead to an increase of malaria incidences “134,224 cases and 194 deaths…if compared 
to 2016 at this same time only 80,964 cases were reported” (284,285).  
 
All samples were logged and labeled with a unique number linking it to a database containing 
detailed description of the medicinal samples (6). All acquired samples were “stored under 
nominal conditions” (in their respective primary and secondary packaging at room temperature) 
(177). Each collected medicine sample consisted usually of 24 tablets which were then divided 
into three subsets (8 tablets for analysis per laboratory institution) in order to test it in the three 
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participating laboratory institutions to assess how many samples were of good quality, substandard 
or falsified. Identification of potential falsified medicinal samples were based on packaging 
inspection (6) and rapid authentication assessments with Raman, NIR and XFR handheld devices. 
Identification of potential substandard samples were based on physical testing (e.g. considerable 
weight and size deviations of tablets within a blister) and chemical analysis results (e.g very low 
or high levels of API, the presence of impurities and/or degradation products outside of acceptable 
limits or issues in the dissolution profile).  
 
After completing tracking, visual and authentication assessments at AiBST laboratory in Harare, 
subset 2 and 3 of the collected samples were shipped to the Novartis Locarno laboratory in 
Switzerland (reference laboratory) for confirmatory HPLC testing, and to the BU laboratory in the 
US for verification of the results on the PharmaChk device. Two different sample definitions were 
used for this study. At BU and Locarno laboratories samples of packages with same batch ID 
sourced from the same pharmacy were defined as one individual sample. For the authentication 
assessments, in particular to identify falsified coartemether, the forensic definition of a sample was 
used, by which every package was considered as an individual sample disregarding batch ID and 
pharmacy location.  
 
For QC purposes, a blinded interlab assay comparison (6) was performed on 20 medicine samples 
at AiBST laboratory in Harare, Zimbabwe, and the BU laboratory to assess the equivalence 
performance of performed assays to the HPLC results from the reference institution in Locarno, 
Switzerland. Moreover confirmatory testing was conducted in the reference laboratory in Locarno 
to evaluate the reliability of the results from AiBST and the BU laboratory. After completion of 
the analysis process, the results were compiled and the outcomes of the three research questions 
will be published and reported to MCAZ. The following graph (Figure 15) summarizes the 
activities of the research project in Zimbabwe.  
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Figure 15 Study activities overview 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sample collection delivery to AiBST analytical testing laboratory in Harare 
 
AiBST laboratory in Harare, Zimbabwe 
- Registration of samples (incl. photograph and price) 
- Visual inspection (weight, size, colour, primary and secondary packaging, label, leaflet,     
   manufacturing and expiry date, registration number, imprint, score) 
- Authentication screening assessments with handheld spectrometer devices (Raman, NIR,  
   XFR) 
- Split of each sample into three subsets and label them accordingly with 1,2 and 3 
- HPLC analysis of subset 1 for artemether and lumefantrine identity and content and for   
   lumefantrine degradation products evaluation 
- Shipment to Basel for preparing subsets 2 and 3 for Boston and Locarno laboratories 
Pharmanalytica SA in Locarno, 
Switzerland 
- Confirmatory HPLC testing of a subset of 
110 samples for identity and content of 
both APIs as well as degradation products 
of lumefantrine 
- Dissolution profile of a subset of 30   
  samples 
 
Boston University laboratory in US 
 
- Lab-to-lab comparison of 20 samples 
with reference laboratory Pharmaco-
analytica SA  
 
- Assessment of both APIs contents with 
PharmaChk device 
 
Analysis and publication of the results from the three participating laboratories 
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 Sample collection 
 
Selection of sites 
This study was performed in seven out of a total of ten provinces in Zimbabwe. We targeted 80 
drug collection sites in 17 cities (Figure 16) across the 7 study provinces in Zimbabwe for the 
procurement of Coartem® and its generic samples (based on the list of registered health authorities 
from MCAZ in 2015). This included public and private health care institutions and the informal 
market (outlets not registered with the MOH) (282). All private and registered retail and 
pharmacies in clinics present on the Zimbabwean health authority list of healthcare institutions 
(MCAZ list 2015) were eligible for inclusion in this pilot study (6). 
Figure 16 Selected study locations (286)  
 
We focused on high and moderate risk zones with malaria incidence rates of 101-405 and 6-100 
(287) and selected the following cities as there were historical entomological data available for 
these regions (morbidity and mortality data by district in 2015) (287): Buhera, Chipinge, Mutare, 
Nyanga, Bindura, Guruve, Mount Darwin, Rushinga, Shamva, Murewa, Mutoko, Zvishavane, 
Murewa, Provinz 
Mashonaland East 
Shamva 
Mount Darwin 
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Chiredzi, Kariba, Zvimba, Harare and Kadoma (Figure 16). We randomly selected eight licensed 
hospital- and 48 community pharmacies in each of the above mentioned cities in the provinces 
Mashonaland Central, East and West, Manicaland, Midlands and Masvingo. Moreover we also 
looked for informal markets in the selected cities. Most of the sample collection sites were in the 
malaria high risk zones Mashonaland and Manicaland with the highest malaria mortality rate of 
over 60% (287). We also included Harare which is considered as a low malaria risk area (malaria 
incidence 0-5) (288), but as mentioned above almost half of the health facilities of the country are 
present there. 
Convenient and random sampling 
Convenient sampling is a technique that selects sites based on convenient accessibility and 
proximity (247). If sufficient sample size is ensured, random sampling provides reliable estimates 
of the prevalence of outlets selling poor quality medicines and their distribution in the defined area 
(289). However according to literature, only very few studies (289) have applied random sampling, 
as this sampling method is expensive, time-consuming and requires complete lists of target outlets 
locations (290).   
 
In this research project we applied the two most common sampling approaches: convenience and 
random sampling method (270). For the sample collection in February 2017, the sites from the 
private health care sector were targeted from the MCAZ list using the application Microsoft Excel 
as the random number generator. With regard to the convenience sampling approach, we 
considered the MCAZ list from February 2017 of the registered medicine outlets in Harare and 
Chitungwiza. For Harare, we grouped the locations in four zones, North, East, South and West and 
tried to visit as many locations as possible in one week. Sample collection in Chitungwiza was 
performed in one day and we considered all sites of the MCAZ list. 
 
Covert mystery-shopper approach 
Mystery shoppers are individuals who visit retail stores, acting as customers to collect information 
about the stores’ display, prices and quality of the products (291,292). In a covert approach the 
identity and purpose of the buyer is not known by the outlet being evaluated; the sellers are blinded 
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(290,293). This approach avoids potential bias (compared to the overt approach) due to 
shopkeepers holding back the drugs that are more likely to be falsified or substandard.  
 
In this survey, the purchase of the medicine samples was performed covertly in all specified 
locations with trained mystery shoppers who were mostly nationals of the country (290). At each 
site, the mystery shopper ascertained if the medicine was available, then recorded the price, name 
of the outlet and other information requested by the survey objectives (272,290). We chose this 
market research tool to reduce the risk of obtaining biased samples in our study (293,294). If sellers 
are concerned that their stock contain poor quality medicines and that the buyer is potentially 
linked to the NMRA, this may influence their selling behavior and the risk of concealing falsified 
and SSMs is increased (290).   
 
Sample size estimation 
As described above the prevalence of substandard/falsified medicines in Zimbabwe is estimated 
to be between 11-44% (median 28.5%) (128). We estimated the sample size for this study 
assuming the median prevalence of 28.5% (p=0.285). To determine the actual prevalence of outlets 
selling substandard and falsified medicines in Zimbabwe with a precision of 5% (e=0.05) with 
95% confidence intervals (z=1.96), we used the following formula (11,295): 
n=
𝑧2(𝑝𝑞)
𝑒2
 = 
(1.96)2∗(0.285)∗(0.715)
(0.05)2
=313.13 
As the estimated prevalence for substandard/falsified medicines in Zimbabwe represents a broad 
range (11-44%), we also calculated the sample size for the lower and higher estimated 
prevalence rate. 
Assessment of the actual prevalence of outlets seeing substandard and falsified medicines 
assuming that the estimated prevalence of SSMs in Zimbabwe is 11%:  
n=
𝑧2(𝑝𝑞)
𝑒2
 = 
(1.96)2∗(0.11)∗(0.89)
(0.05)2
 = 150.44 
Assumption that the estimated prevalence of SSMs in Zimbabwe is 44%:  
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n=
𝑧2(𝑝𝑞)
𝑒2
 =
(1.96)2∗(0.44)∗(0.56)
(0.05)2
 = 378.68 
n= sample size  
z= standard error associated with the chosen level of confidence (1.96) 
p=estimated percent in the population 
q=100-p 
e= acceptable sample error 
Thus we would need a random sample size (n) of at least 151. This meant that procurement from 
at least 151 different outlets selling coartemether medicines would be required to obtain an 
objective estimate of the prevalence of those selling substandard and/or falsified coartemether 
drugs at one time point in Zimbabwe (11). 
Selection of medicines to be purchased 
All six targeted coartemether medicinal products had achieved WHO prequalification (296). At 
each site, a minimum of two packages [one served as backup for possible additional analysis (282)] 
of each of the six products were purchased. If the respective medicine was not available at the 
targeted site, the mystery shoppers went to other retail pharmacies to purchase the required 
samples.  
 
In July 2015 MCAZ issued a recategorisation of antimalarial combination drug artemether-
lumefantrine from a Prescription Preparation (PP) to a Pharmacist Initiated Medicines (PIM) “in 
line with the “New WHO recommendations and the current National policy on Malaria” (297). 
Pharmacist Initiated Medicines (PIM) are defined as “medicines that may be initiated and 
dispensed by a pharmacist without a prescription” (298). In both private and public health care 
facilities this combination drug should be provided to patients after confirmation of marlaria 
infection with a rapid diagnostic test (RDT) (253). For this research study a physician from AiBST 
hospital issued the required prescriptions to allow the mystery shoppers to purchase the medicinal 
products. Permission was granted from MCAZ. To avoid misuse of these prescriptions (use of 
prescriptions other than in this project), the mystery shoppers were asked to track the collection 
with receipts from the pharmacies confirming that the drug was obtained. 
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Coartem® brand tablets (containing 20mg artemether and 120mg Lumefantrine) and the respective 
reference substances of both APIs were provided by Novartis Pharma AG to the BU and the Harare 
laboratory in order to calibrate the devices. 
Details of the APIs 
 
The antimalarial agent used in this research study included a fixed-dose combination of two APIs 
artemether and lumefantrine (ratio of 1:6) (Figure 17). Both components are crystalline powders 
but differ in colour (artemether is white, lumefantrine is yellow) and solubility (lumefantrine is a 
highly lipophilic compound) (299). Artememether and lumefantrine are blood schizontocides and 
inhibit nucleic acid and protein synthesis in erythrocytic stages of Plasmodium falciparum (299). 
The elimination of artemether and active metabolite Dihydroartemisinin (DHA) from plasma is 
much faster (half-life two hours) than the elimination of lumefantrine (elimination half-life 3-6 
days) (299). Currently there is no monograph for Coartem® dispersible tablets in the British 
Pharmacopoeia (BPh), United States Pharmacopoeia (USP) or Japanese Pharmacopoeia (JP), only 
a draft international monograph is available from WHO (300).  
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Figure 17 Chemical structures of artemether and lumefantrine (299) 
 
 
 Drug Quality Assessments 
 
We performed several tests to evaluate the quality of Coartem® and its generic medicinal products 
collected in a field study in Zimbabwe.  
 
Visual evaluation and physical testing 
All medicine samples underwent visual and physical inspection for labeling and packaging before 
physico-chemical quality testing (23) was performed. Visual assessments included weight, size 
measurement, color and presence of score and imprints of the procured tablets. The primary 
packaging of each medicinal sample was scanned electronically and/or photographed and 
compared against authentic packaging, wherever available (6). Weight measurements were 
performed by using an analytical balance (precision: 0.00 mg). We used a digital caliper (precision: 
0.00 mm) for measuring tablet thickness and diameter. Coartem® tablets were used as reference 
with specification ranges for weight of 0.228-0.252g, tablet thickness of 3.0-3.4 mm and diameter 
of 9.1-9.2 mm (177).  
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Qualitative and quantitative screening assessments of the collected samples 
Qualitative screening tests of collected samples 
Handheld spectroscopic devices such as Raman, NIR (Table 5) and XFR (from ThermoFisher 
Scientific) use qualitative methods (177) and can quickly and accurately scan a medicine sample 
and determine its legitimacy (177). These techniques do not destroy the sample and allow a high 
throughput of samples (173,177). The application of NIR spectroscopy can identify subtle changes 
in the chemical composition of a medicinal sample by degree of similarity to the identified 
compound and detect differences between genuine and falsified drug products. Moreover, Raman 
spectroscopy allows uncovering slight changes in chemical structure and morphology of the tested 
samples (301). The XRF spectrometer allows rapid qualitative assessment of the elemental 
composition of materials (302) by measuring the characteristic fluorescent X-rays emitted from 
each of the elements present in a sample when it is excited by a primary X-ray source (303) .  
 
As each of the collected sample packages were divided into three subsets (Figure 15), for the 
authentication assessments (Raman, NIR and XFR), one tablet was randomly taken from each of 
the three subsets and Raman, NIR and XFR analysis were performed (177,304). Before analysis 
of the investigated medicine samples, a reference spectrum for Coartem® was stored in the 
instrument library of Raman and NIR devices. When a medicinal sample containing coartemether 
was run, the result was displayed on the screen indicating whether the product “passed” or “failed” 
and therefore confirming whether the generated spectrum matches the one of the reference product 
Coartem®. A probability value describes how closely the spectrum of the analyzed sample is to the 
signature spectra of genuine Coartem®. The tested sample passed if its probability value was higher 
than 0.05 (Figure 18). If the sample failed (Figure 19), the sample spectrum was compared with 
other signatures stored in the library and the closest matches were displayed on the screen along 
with the spectra of Coartem® and the sample spectrum (305). The spectra were compared to the 
original brand reference (177).  
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Figure 18 Raman spectrometer analysis of a Coartem® tablet - Pass result and spectrum 
comparison with Coartem® reference spectrum                                                                                     
                                                                                                                                                                                               
 
Figure 19 Raman spectrometer analysis of a Coartem® tablet - Fail result and spectrum 
comparison with Coartem® reference spectrum 
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Quantitative screening test of collected samples 
Existing field technologies in medicines screening have not yet been able to accurately quantify 
the API content. PharmaChk is a low-cost, portable drug screening device which allows API 
quantification and API kinetic release. This instrument is based on a microfluidic, flow-through 
technology that uses fluorescent reporters to specifically quantify API molecules from a solid 
formulation in solution (173).  
 
After arrival of subset 2 of the medicinal samples at the BU laboratory, one tablet from each sample 
was randomly taken and tested for API content using the PharmaChk device. Each sample was 
measured relative to an authentic reference sample (177). 
 
Confirmatory assessments 
Content and degradation testing was carried out on subset 1 of the samples in Harare with gold 
standard technology HPLC using the Novartis monograph. Content evaluation determined the 
amount of both APIs (artemether and lumefantrine) present as a percentage of the declared strength 
in the product data sheet. Analysis of degradation products on the collected medicine samples was 
performed to differentiate between medicines that were substandard due to poor manufacturing 
practice versus degradation post-manufacture (6).  
As first steps of the HPLC analysis, sample tablets were pulverized and extracted in an appropriate 
solvent. Thereafter the solvent extracts were sonicated followed by centrifugation, and finally the 
supernatant was injected into the HPLC system for determining the content of both APIs (6). The 
API amounts were assessed by comparing the amount of API in eluents of each dissolution sample 
against a calibrated standard for artemether and lumefantrine after HPLC analysis (6). 
 
As mentioned above, subset 2 was sent to the BU laboratory for API content analysis with 
PharmaChk device. 
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Subset 3 of the samples was sent to the Pharmanalytica SA laboratory in Locarno, Switzerland (a 
GMP accredited laboratory) for HPLC analysis confirming content, degradation and dissolution 
profiles (6). All confirmatory tests were conducted according to Novartis monograph.  
 
11 Results 
 Numbers of samples collected: Random sampling versus convenient sampling 
Initially we planned one collection round of medicinal product samples using random sampling in 
17 cities between February 6-14, 2017. As only 76 medicinal packages of Coartem® and its generic 
versions could be acquired from 86 drug outlets (including retail pharmacies, pharmacies in clinics 
and informal outlets), we conducted a second round of sample collection where we performed 
convenient sampling. This took place from March 28 to April 3, 2017, in Harare and Chitungwiza 
where we acquired 210 packages from 114 visited drug outlets. In total 200 health care facilities 
including informal outlets were visited at two different time points across 7 of 10 provinces of 
Zimbabwe, and a total of 286 (76 + 210) samples were collected. 
It is noteworthy that the essential medicine coartemether was provided free of cost in all public 
hospitals and health centres with a prescription. We did not obtain any medicines from visited 
public hospitals (with the exception of one facility) as these did not serve retail customers or 
dispensed antimalarial drugs unless thepatient provided a positive rapid diagnostic test (RDT). 
Informal markets were found in Harare, Shamva, Kadoma, Buhera and Murehwa, however no 
antimalarials were sold. The pie chart below (Figure 20) illustrates the number of purchased 
packages of the different brands. The most common generic brand was Lumartem. Two of the 
targeted six registered coartemether medicines (Artefan and Combiart) (306) were not available at 
any healthcare facility at both collection time points. Indeed, most of the sellers did not even 
recognize the names of these two branded generic medicines. In addition, one of the purchased 
brands (Lonart) was not licensed for use in Zimbabwe. These were sourced from two retail 
pharmacies in Harare and Kadoma. 
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Figure 20 Name and number of procured medicinal packages of coartemether from 17 cities of 
Zimbabwe 
 
In total, we obtained 286 packages of coartemether (N=285 packages from private sector and 1 
package from the public sector) and 2 packages of sulfadoxine and pyrimethamine as requested 
medicine combination was not available at one of the sites. These two packages of sulfadoxine 
and pyrimethamine were excluded from further analysis as the scope of this project was the 
evaluation of quality of coartemether medicines. In most of the pharmacies only one of the five 
registered coartemether brands was available. The 286 medicinal packages of coartemether were 
considered for visual inspection and authentication assessments (Raman, NIR and XFR). For the 
confirmatory analysis as well as for the screening test with PharmaChk device a subset of the 
collected samples was analyzed. The original brand Coartem® was considered as reference for the 
analysis and provided by Novartis Pharma AG to all participating laboratories.  
 Visual inspection 
 Physical characteristics: Weights and dimensions  
 
Table 6 presents the weights and dimensions of the 17 collected Coartem® brand tablets relative 
to the range expected for the genuine tablets (177). Any tablets measurements falling outside the 
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acceptable range would be considered as “failed”. Weight and dimension measurements reveal 
that all collected Coartem® samples were within the acceptable limits. 
Table 6 Weights and dimensions of purchased medicine samples of innovator brand Coartem® 
Case number Diameter (mm) Tablet thickness (mm) Weight (g) 
Expected 
dimensions 
9.1-9.2 mm 3.0-3.4 mm 0.228-0.252g 
HA-007-01 9.16 3.2 0.245 
HA-008-01 9.13 3.16 0.243 
HA-023-1 9.08 3.22 0.242 
HA-088-1 9.08 3.18 0.244 
HA-089-1 9.11 3.18 0.241 
HA-090-1 9.11 3.17 0.242 
HA-091-1 9.1 3.16 0.242 
HA-096-1 9.11 3.17 0.242 
HA-097-1 9.1 3.19 0.243 
HA-153-1 9.15 3.18 0.241 
HA-185-1 9.17 3.2 0.243 
HA 213-1 9.16 3.16 0.240 
HA-214-1 9.14 3.22 0.245 
BI-005-1 NA NA NA 
BI -006-1 9.13 3.13 0.242 
ZA003-1 9.1 3.21 0.244 
CI001-1 9.12 3.14 0.239 
NA: Not available 
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Table 7 Average weights and dimensions of purchased medicine samples of generic versions of 
Coartem® 
Product name Diameter (mm) Tablet thickness (mm) Weight (g) 
Lumartem 10.10 3.57 0.351 
Lonart 10.28 4.46 0.332 
Lumiter 8.93 3.59 0.250 
Komefan 9.10 3.90 0.305 
Komefan 280 11.64 4.88 0.601 
 
There were no reference tablets for the registered and prequalified brands (Komefan; Komefan 
280; Lumartem; Lumiter) available, therefore the WHO prequalification documents (Part 2b-
Visual appearance of the product and part 4-Summary of Product Characteristics) were used as 
guidance. According to these guidelines (307–311) all medicine samples from registered and 
prequalified brands (Komefan, Komefan 280, Lumartem, Lumiter, Coartem®) passed the visual 
inspection including colour and diameter. All sourced tablets were yellow coloured, circular, flat, 
beveled-edged and uncoated. All scores of collected samples passed except of Lumiter who 
showed a different score than the WHO prequalification documents [with one side plein and other 
side “MPL”; collected samples are plain on both sides] (312). But as there were no reference tablets 
available for Lumiter, a definitive assessment could not be made. The weight and thickness of the 
other registered brands could not be evaluated as there was no information available in the WHO 
prequalified documents. Table 7 revealed that there was a match with the weight and dimensions 
of the collected Coartem® samples in only two cases (average of Komefan diameter result and 
Lumiter average weight result).  
 Packaging inspection 
The inspection and comparison of the packaging of collected Coartem® samples against available 
Coartem® genuine tablets revealed that there were no obviously falsified packages. For all other 
registered brands drug packaging appeared appropriate with correctly stated dose, type of drug, 
batch number, expiration date and manufacture date (282) as well as the MCAZ registration 
number. However the original drug packaging from the manufacturer was not available for 
comparison (6).  
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For 244 medicine packages (85%) primary packaging was available. It was also found that for 
only 192 packages of 286 packages (67%) the package insert was available. All procured medicine 
samples, except the original brand, were manufactured in India.   
Expiry information 
Four medicine packages (1.4%) were found to be expired at the time of purchase. No expiration 
date information was available for 4 medicine samples (1.4%) which were dispensed as 24 loose 
tablets in a plastic bag without packaging information.  
 Authentication screening tests  
 Raman spectrometry results 
In total, 92% (N=262) of the samples passed the Raman authentication test; in 6% (N=17) of the 
cases the results were inconclusive. In 1% (N=4) of the cases, the samples failed the Raman test.   
 NIR spectrometry results 
In total, 62% (N=177) of the samples passed the NIR authentication test; in 25% (N=71) of the 
cases the results were inconclusive. In 12% (N=35) of the cases, the samples failed the NIR 
analysis.  
 XRF spectrometer results 
The XRF spectrometer analyzed the presence of elemental impurities, in total 44 elements were 
considered.  
According to the ICH Guidelines for elemental impurities, elements to be considered  
in risk assessment (if not intentionally added) for oral treatment are cadmium, lead, arsenic, 
mercury, cobalt, vanadium and nickel (313). A total of 216 collected samples contained cadmium. 
None of the others elements (lead, arsenic, mercury, cobalt, vanadium and nickel) were available. 
As the XFR spectrometer is a non-destructive device, the screened samples remained intact and 
allow “those testing positive for cadmium to be sent for confirmatory laboratory analysis” (314). 
 PharmaChk device results 
The nine results of collected samples (Table 8) below reveal the contents of both APIs and are 
roughly comparable to results of gold standard HPLC. The deviation of artemether to HPLC 
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content results was maximum 5% and for lumefantrine maximum 4%. The analysis was conducted 
for purpose of cross-validation of the three participating laboratories.  
Table 8 Preliminary results of collected samples on PharmaChk instrument 
Samples 
Artemether 
PharmaChk 
(spectro-
photometric 
results) 
Content of 
artemether 
determined 
by HPLC 
Discrepancy 
between 
HPLC and 
spectrophoto-
metric results 
for 
artemether 
Lumefantrine 
PharmaChk 
(spectrophoto-
metric results) 
Content of 
lumefantrine 
determined 
by HPLC 
Discrepancy 
between 
HPLC and 
spectrophoto-
metric results 
for 
lumefantrine 
HA-101 102.20% 101.24% 0.95% 102.09% 101.20% 0.88% 
MA-003 100.13% 102.73% -2.53% 101.53% 100.74% 0.78% 
HA-207 104.90% 103.73% 1.13% 100.24% 100.33% -0.09% 
ZE-004 102.76% 105.01% -2.14% 100.91% 98.61% 2.33% 
BI-001 100.64% 105.78% -4.86% 98.74% 99.12% -0.38% 
HA-219 101.98% 100.97% 1.00% 101.23% 100.09% 1.14% 
CE-001 99.64% 102.57% -2.86% 101.41% 99.82% 1.59% 
KO-008 98.73% 104.29% -5.33% 100.81% 100.12% 0.69% 
HA-043 102.20% 100.96% 1.23% 101.91% 98.15% 3.83% 
Ranges 
98.73%-
104.90% 
100.96%-
105.78% 
-5.33%-
1.13% 
98.74%-
102.09% 
98.15%-
101.20% -0.38%-3.83% 
 Confirmatory HPLC and dissolution profile results from reference laboratory 
The confirmatory testing at the Pharmanalytica SA was conducted from July-August 2017. A 
quarter of the collected medicine samples (75/286) were expired at the time of confirmatory HPLC 
analysis. Content evaluation of both APIs, degradation product analysis of lumefantrine were 
performed on a subset of 14 expired medicine samples which had expired two months before 
confirmatory analysis. Moreover the dissolution profile was assessed on a subset of 6 out of the 
14 expired samples.    
At the Locarno laboratory, packages with same batch ID sourced from the same pharmacy were 
defined as one individual sample, therefore the 286 collected packages of coartemether 
corresponded to 156 samples (included expired and nonexpired medicine samples). Content 
quantification of both APIs as well as degradation test of lumefantrine was conducted on a subset 
of 110 samples. We used Novartis HPLC monograph for testing the samples with the dosage of 
20/120mg. There is no international monograph existing for coartemether combination with 
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40/240mg dosage, therefore the reference laboratory developed a new assay for API content 
evaluation of 40/240mg formulation based on the Novartis monograph for 40/280mg and 
considered a further dilution step.  
 API content evaluation 
Content analysis (in percentage) of both APIs was carried out on a subset of 110 samples. API 
ingredients within the range of 90-110% were considered as good quality (standard) and API 
outside this range were defined as substandard (315). This follows the recommendations of the 
International Pharmacopoeia for the analysis of single-tablet samples (6). “The %API was 
calculated as a percent of the authentic reference tablet” (177). A subset of 110 collected samples 
were analyzed by HPLC in the reference laboratory in Locarno. All analyzed samples contained 
the stated API amounts (Figure 21) and complied with the International Pharmacopoeia 
requirements (6). Overall 100% (N=110) contained ≥ 90 and    ≤ 110% of the stated APIs and were 
considered of satisfactory quality for single tablet analysis (Table 10 Annex) with 95% CI 
(artemether): [101.09%-101.93%] and 95% CI (lumefantrine): [99.77- 100.28]. The HPLC 
analysis of the medicine samples at AiBST are still ongoing. The results will be published in 
Lancet Global Health journal (Chapter 15).  
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Figure 21 API% content of artemether and lumefantrine 
 
 Degradation products assessment for lumefantrine 
According to Novartis specifications the degradation products for lumefantrine should not exceed 
0.3% of the declared content. The total impurities for lumefantrine of the analyzed subset of 110 
samples were within required specifications (range <0.05%-0.21%) [Table 10 Annex].  
 Dissolution profile 
A subset of 30 randomly selected samples of expired and unexpired products (Figure 22) was 
analyzed by in vitro dissolution methods and content assessment of both APIs (artemether and 
lumefantrine) by HPLC (282). According to Novartis in vitro dissolution testing protocols, 
dissolution rates (DRs) are measured at different time points. For lumefantrine after 45 minutes 
and for artemether after 1 and 3 hours. The DR of lumefantrine after 45 minutes analyzed by liquid 
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chromatography (LC) should not be less than 60% of the declared content. Dissolution of 
artemether analyzed by LC should not be less than 45% after 1 hour and not less than 65% of the 
declared content after 3 hours. 95% Confidence intervals of the dissolution rates were calculated 
with the Clopper-Pearson method (316) 95% CI (DR artemether 1h): [53.79-87.50]; 95% CI (DR 
artemether 3h): [75.95-98.67]; 95% CI (DR lumefantrine 45`): [64.42-93.91]. The DRs of all tested 
samples for both APIs were within specifications (Table 11 Annex).  
 
Figure 22 DR of artemether and lumefantrine in selected samples 
 
 Price and quality question 
The lowest average price of the sourced brands of coartemether with dosage 20/120mg was 5.50 
$US and the highest 9.50 $US (Table 9) per package including 24 tablets. The unregistered brand 
Lonart was the most expensive on the Zimbabwean market. There is no correlation between higher 
price and improved quality in our study as all purchased samples were of satisfactory quality.  
This is an important finding, with public health and pharmacoeconomic relevance. The following 
table also includes the medicinal product Komefan 280 with dosage 40/240mg which was 
dispensed to the covert shoppers when coartemether with dosage 20/120mg was not available. 
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Table 9 Price of procured medicinal brands of coartemether per package: 
Trade name Number of purchased packages  Average price in $US 
Coartem® 17 8.3 
Komefan 6 5.5 
Komefan 280 24 7.2 
Lumiter 105 6.7 
Lonart 4 9.5 
Lumartem 130 7.4 
 
 Discussion of Part 3 
This study illustrated the use of a variety of portable, easy to operate analytical screening devices 
to determine the percentage of available good quality product versus substandard and falsified 
versions of Coartem® and its generic versions purchased from various sources (177). 
To our knowledge, this was the first quality survey on the national first-line treatment of 
uncomplicated Plasmodium falciparum malaria (6) in Zimbabwe (101). A literature review reveals 
that there are only very few research projects that performed random sampling collection of 
medicinal products in a covert approach including all four levels of analysis: physical, package 
inspection, chemical, and authentication of source (101). In addition to the common qualitative 
screening tools Raman, NIR and XFR, we used the quantitative screening device PharmaChk 
which accurately determined the quantity of both APIs. Regarding the chemical analysis, we 
performed not only API content determination and impurities assessment, but also investigated the 
presence of degradation products to get more insight onto the transport and storage of the 
purchased pharmaceuticals. Moreorver, we evaluated the dissolution profile which conclusively 
determined if a product was substandard or not. In addition to the evaluation of medicines quality 
of collected medicines, we supported the local regulatory authority by training and establishing a 
laboratory of excellence through a private industry collaboration to identify substandard and 
falsified medicines.  
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In this research project we conducted a three-tiered analysis approach including visual inspection 
and physical testing (packaging, weight, dimensions, colour); spectrometric and fluoroscopic 
techniques for rapid detection of quality and quantity (Raman, NIR, XFR, PharmaChk) and 
confirmatory testing for identification, quantification and dissolution profile evaluation of the APIs 
(HPLC, dissolution tester) (177).  
The screening and confirmatory assessments performed revealed that all collected samples of 
fixed-dose combination drug of artemether and lumefantrine were of satisfactory quality. The 
results from both screening tests of Raman and NIR showed that none of the collected packages 
were falsified. All 17 purchased packages of the original brand Coartem® passed the Raman test 
and 15/17 passed the NIR analysis (2 samples showed both Pass and Fail results). In total, 93% of 
all sourced medicinal products including Coartem® and its generic versions showed a pass in the 
Raman test, while 63% passed the NIR testing indicating that both APIs were available. The results 
from NIR and Raman indicate some disparity when comparing to HPLC results as these revealed 
that all collected samples were of satisfactory quality.  
Both handheld spectrometer devices performed qualitative testing and were not able to accurately 
quantify the API content. Ultimately these two spectroscopic methods could not determine whether 
any of the medicinal products under test were substandard.. This is also reflected by the literature 
describing that both devices are not suitable for detection of SSMs (220,317).  However, a 
limitation of this study was that the original brand Coartem® was used as the only reference for 
comparison of the analytical testing results for all purchased medicinal products including the 
generic versions. The absence of a repository of reference samples or spectra of the other five 
medicinal brands prevented the analysis of tablets by direct comparison (221). In particular, the 
consequence of this limitation came to light in the case of the sourced unregistered product Lonart. 
All four collected medicine packages failed both Raman and NIR tests which was due to the 
different pharmaceutical composition and the excipients used.  In addition to the results of Raman 
and NIR ascertaining the presence of both APIs, the analysis of XFR revealed that there was no 
risk of elemental impurities.  
Beyond the qualitative analysis, the screening device PharmaChk was able to specifically and 
accurately quantify the content of both APIs and therefore can be used to identify substandard and 
falsified medicines. The PharmaChk analysis yielded to comparable results with gold standard 
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HPLC (maximum deviation 5%). As a next step, the PharmaChk instrument needs to be evaluated 
for its operational accuracy and feasibility (6).  
The qualitative and quantitative screening results were verified by HPLC and dissolution analysis. 
Confirmatory testing in the reference laboratory in Locarno determined that the content and DRs 
of both APIs as well as the total impurities rate of lumefantrine for the analyzed subset (range 
<0.05%-0.21%) were within required specifications (<0.3%). The content of artemether amounted 
to 96.49%-106.86% whereas the measured content for lumefantrine was 95.34%-103.02%. 
Overall, all collected samples contained the stated amounts of both APIs. The dissolution profile 
analysis of the subset of 30 samples comprised both expired and non-expired medicine samples. 
All 6 Komefan 280 samples showed acceptable DRs of artemether (average DR 1h:72% and 3h: 
90%) and lumefantrine (DR 45`:94%) despite being three months past their expiry date at the time 
of analysis. This corroborates the fact that artemether and lumefantrine are inherently stable and 
not praticularly sensitive to heat and humidity (6). In total, all tested samples met the tolerance 
limits for dissolution in this study.  
In addition we explored if there was a correlation between quality and price. We observed a broad 
price range: from $US 5.50-9.50. As all collected medicine samples were of good quality, we 
determined that there was no correlation between price and quality. Bate et al. observed similar 
finding in their study where they focused on “eight drug types on the WHO-approved medicine 
list from 17 LMIC countries”. The outcome of their study was that “failing drugs and non-failing 
generics overlap greatly in price, making it difficult to identify failing drugs based on price” (318). 
Despite the satisfactory quality of the medicines under test, a number of other concerns were 
revealed. First, there was a level of concern on governmental medicine samples that were diverted 
to retail pharmacies and sold at a relatively high price. This diversion of supplies was apparent as 
the inscription “Not for retail sale” on the primary packaging was cut or scraped off. This illegal 
act may lead to limited access of this essential medicine in neighboring public hospitals and health 
centers (319).  
Second, four of the collected samples were past their expiration date at the time of purchase (6). 
According to US Pharmacopoia, “the expiration date limits the time during which the article may 
be dispensed or used” (320). If antimalarial medicines are stored beyond their expiration date, they 
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may degrade (6), which may lead to “sub-therapeutic levels of the API and put the malaria patient 
in risk and also increase the risk of the drug-resistant parasites” (6). The US Pharmacopoeia 
General Notices and Requirements of this Pharmacopoeia indicates that “where an official article 
is required to bear an expiration date, such article shall be dispensed solely in, or from, a container 
labeled with an expiration date, and the date on which the article is dispensed shall be within the 
labeled expiry period” (321).  
Third, at two collection sites, the fixed-dose combination drug of artemether and lumefantrine was 
dispensed in loose plastic bags excluding primary and secondary packaging and the patient 
information leaflet (medication package insert). The medicines name on the handwritten label 
indicated the innovator`s brand name whereas through visual inspection of the score of the tablet 
this medicinal product was unequivocally a generic version. Without the proper packaging, the 
medicinal products may degrade due to high temperature, moisture and light (322). Moreover, the 
expiry date was also not indicated on the label written by the pharmacist. The United States 
Pharmacopoeia General Notices and Requirements states that “the label of an official drug 
product…shall bear an expiration date” (321).    
Fourth, in 30% of the cases (n=86), the patient information leaflet was not provided by the health 
care facility which leaves the patient unaware of potential side effects, contraindications and 
storage characteristics of the medication. Fifth, in most of the cases a label was present which 
included pharmacist’s instructions on how to take the medicine, however there was a great 
discrepancy within respect to level of detail. Moreover in 23/283 cases, the expiration date on the 
label did not correspond to the one on the primary and secondary packaging. In most of these cases 
the handwritten expiration date by the pharmacist on the packaging was significantly longer than 
those in the official packaging material. This presents considerable concern since it is known as 
described above that the medicinal product stored beyond expiration date may degrade and 
therefore can lead to subtherapeutic levels of API and potentially put the malaria patient at risk 
(6). In the United States Pharmacopoia General Notices and Requirements of this Pharmacopoeia 
the term “beyond-use date” is defined as “the date after which an article must not be used. For 
nonsterile solid and liquid dosage forms that are packaged in single-unit and unit-dose containers, 
the beyond-use date shall be 1 year from the date the drug is packaged into the single-unit or unit-
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dose container or the expiration date on the manufacturer`s container, whichever is earlier, unless 
stability data or the manufacturer`s labeling indicates otherwise” (321). 
In this pilot study we applied a mixed approach using random and convenience sampling. We 
noticed limited access of coartemether combination medicines despite prevailing peak malaria 
season in the private sector during the first collection round where we used covert random 
sampling approach in the 17 targeted cities throughout Zimbabwe. Thus we would need a random 
sample size (n) of at least 151. This meant that procurement from at least 151 different outlets 
selling coartemether medicines would be required to obtain an objective estimate of the prevalence 
of those selling substandard and/or falsified coartemether drugs at one time point in Zimbabwe 
(11). 
Zimbabwe has a broad estimated prevalence range of 11-44%. Based on the assumption of the 
estimated prevalence of 11% and the sample size calculation result, we needed to collect samples 
from 151 outlets to obtain an objective estimate of the prevalence of outlets selling substandard 
and/or falsified coartemether medicines at one time point in Zimbabwe. We visited 200 sites from 
the public sector if we combine the number of samples applying random and convenience 
sampling. Unfortunately, we could not visit the required 314 outlets (assumption prevalence of 
substandard medicines and counterfeit medicines in Zimbabwe is 28.5%) based on a random 
sampling approach. We were only able to acquire 76 packs of medicines by random sampling 
collection from 86 visited sites of the private sector including retail and hospital pharmacies and 
informal drug outlets.  
In the subsequent sample collection in March 2017, we applied convenience sampling which 
enabled the purchase of 210 medicinal packages from 114 drug outlets in one week, a threefold 
increase of the number of samples. This is presumably one more reason why most of the medicine 
quality surveys apply convenience sampling. Moreover, among the six registered brands, only four 
(Coartem®, Lumiter, Lumartem, Komefan) were available at the selected sites. In addition, at two 
pharmacies, four medicinal packages of a generic unregistered brand (Lonart) was sold, which is 
also not WHO-prequalified. This is alarming and contravenes against the recommendations of the 
WHO Expert Committee emphasizing to drug regulatory authorities to only purchase medicines 
from prequalified manufacturers (323). With regards to the informal market situation of this 
country, illicit outlets were available in some of the targeted cities including Harare, Shamva, 
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Kadoma, Buhera and Murehwa. No antimalarials were sold, but medicines for erectile dysfunction, 
antibiotics, painkillers and skin-whitening creams were all available.  
Our study had a number of limitations (6). Although we did not reach the required sample size in 
this pilot study to obtain a prevalence estimate of antimalarial drug quality (282), we considered it 
was ethically unacceptable (6) to carry out a third sample collection round. Since it was peak 
malaria season from January to April in Zimbabwe, we did not want to exacerbate the  limited 
access to this essential medicine. Moreover, this study was only conducted in the private sector 
and not in public health facilities where the scale of the problem of expired and substandard drug 
remains unknown and deserves attention (6). Indeed, it would also be interesting to assess if there 
are higher rate of SSMs in the public sector due to the cheaper prices. Finally, this pilot study “only 
produced a snapshot in time and only reports on the quality of” artemether lumefantrine with 
dosage 20/120mg.  
We recognized  various challenges when planning and conducting the field study on quality of 
antimalarials in Zimbabwe. One of the challenges was, despite guidelines from WHO (324) and 
researchers (11) on the subject of the quality of medicines, it is not clear what is the most suitable 
approach for procuring medicine samples for the analysis of drug quality [random sampling or lot 
quality assurance sampling (LQAS)] (6). Moreover, there is no single accepted range for defining 
medicine samples as being good quality in terms of %API (6). While the International 
Pharmacopoeia requires for assay of tablets 90-110% of API content of the label claim (325), “the 
ICH and USP recommend that the percentage concentration of API should fall within 80% - 120%” 
(326). 
There are several guidance documents required for the conduct of field studies for medicines 
quality evaluation. These include instructions for procurement of medicinal samples, sample 
analysis guidelines and reporting guidelines. There is a necessity of a standard methodological 
approach to assessment of medicines quality [with not only the focus on falsified medicines (e.g. 
WHO Draft guidance on testing of “suspect” falsified medicines (231) or Council of Europe: 
Testing of counterfeit/illegal medicines (232)] including all relevant instructions and 
recommendations in order to guarantee that the results of these field studies are valid and robust 
to enable decision making and development of policies by regulators. 
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12 Conclusion of Part 3 
In the quality medicine pilot study carried out here, no suspected falsified and/or substandard 
samples of coartemether were identified in the private health sector in Zimbabwe. The results of 
both qualitative and quantitative screening methods were corroborated by confirmatory analysis 
revealing that all collected samples of coartemether were of satisfactory quality. However, the 
presence of diverted medicinal products from public into private health care facilities as well as 
the availability of antimalarial drug that are outside of national policy and guidelines warrant 
further investigation by the local regulatory authority.  
This study showed that the quantitative screening tool PharmaChk device is ready for testing under 
field conditions. The implementation of this device, which can be continuously used in the field 
by drug inspectors, law enforcement officials, and pharmacists, is required to quickly assess 
whether medicines are substandard or falsified (6). As issues of poor quality medicines do not only 
affect antimalarial medicines, further research should be conducted to assess medication for 
treatment of other diseases focusing on treatment of conditions associated with high mortality and 
high morbidity.  
 
Global collaboration is required to combat the increasing threat of substandard and falsified 
medicines. This research project showed the successful research collaboration of non-private and 
private institutions on capacity building in the field of quality of medicines (101).    
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13 Final discussion and outlook  
The topic of SSMs is a multifaceted and largely neglected problem (28,327). Since 1988 “falsified 
medicines have achieved most attention” (6). Most of the studies performed until now did not 
differentiate between falsified and SSMs (14). Although SSMs show greatest prevalence in 
developing countries (328), the increase in number of medicine recalls in UK and Portugal (8,55) 
and cases of malaria resistances in UK (329,330) highlight the omnipresence of this burden. SSMs 
still cause thousands of adverse reactions and some deaths (331) and are a substantial threat to 
public health. Due to lack of clarification on the definition of SSMs and description of its multiple 
categories (Figure 2) as well as the presence of only few prevalence studies of SSMs, the true 
extent of the problem is not well documented. Strategic QC testing is a cornerstone of the 
mechanisms in place to protect against substandard medicinal products (332). Most field studies 
were performed with antimicrobials, but only few on non-communicable diseases such as diabetes, 
cancer etc. (101).  
Due to the different causes why SSMs may arise (12), the detection of SSMs is a big challenge 
and requires a strong global post-marketing surveillance and inspection system as well as routine 
QC (23). Hence, the detection of SSMs essential and requires particular attention. In my research 
I focused on the development of two innovative detection approaches and validated these in a field 
study in Zimbabwe.  
Part 1 of this thesis described the effective approach of analyzing the pharmacovigilance database 
Vigibase® with disproportionality statistics to support the detection of SSMs. This detection tool 
can be characterized as time-, resource and cost-efficient. This approach can be applied worldwide 
to facilitate the selection process of medicines for quality testing in field surveys. The greatest 
disadvantage of all available pharmacovigilance databases and registries is the quality and 
relatively limited numbers of available reports, due to under-reporting (170). All these data sources 
have  a common problem in that most occurrences are “probably unreported, reported to the wrong 
agencies, or kept confidential” (98). There is a paucity of data in the field of established medicines 
(Chapter 10.1). The study on Vigibase® (Chapter 8) revealed that common data sources on ICSRs 
in pharmacovigilance databases contain mostly generic names but a more limited data set with full 
trade names. This aggravates the detection of SSMs as there could be various trade names either 
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registered or unlicensed pharmaceuticals behind each of the generic names and increase the risk of 
duplication of cases (Chapter 8). In addition, there is no presence of physical samples of the 
suspected medicinal products which impedes clearing up the cases by conducting secondary 
research including analytical testing.  
The implementation of MedDRA® version 19.0 in March 2016 deployed a new (27th) System 
Organ Class (SOC) called ‘Product Issues’ update on the 27th SOC Product issues (333). This will 
increase the capability of explicit coding of ICSRs associated with medicinal products, as well as 
improving retrievals and outputs related to terms describing such events. In the future the 
pharmaceutical industry and regulatory authorities should collaborate with the MedDRA® MSSO 
to develop a standardized MedDRA® query (SMQ) for SSMs. This standardized list could 
comprise a core or narrow list specific to characteristic features caused by SSMs. Beyond this 
would be an extended or broad group of terms which would increase the retrieval of ICSR 
potentially associated with SSMs, and other issues with product quality; devices, manufacturing 
and quality systems; supply and distribution and falsified medicinal products. Existing PTs/Lowest 
Level Terms (LLTs) will be moved to more specific groupings and new manufacturing and quality 
system terms will be added. In future mining analyses these fundamental changes to assess the 
feasibility of revealing more tightly defined and precise clusters indicative of potential SSMs shall 
further be considered. In order to improve the performance of the developed algorithm there should 
be continued efforts to work with the MedDRA® MSSO to refine and extend the new SOC with 
the goal of extending the utility by providing the capability to conduct research for product-specific 
issues.  
 
Part 2 of the thesis outlined the state of the art of analytical technologies used for identification of 
SSMs with particular focus on the PharmaChk device. Currently this is the only existing instrument 
which unifies the abilities of identifying and accurately quantifying APIs as well as their 
dissolution profile (28). For the first time a fixed-combination medicine of two pharmaceutical 
compounds (artemether and lumefantrine) was tested on the PharmaChk device. Thus part 3 of 
this thesis showed the successful implementation of the Coartem® assay on the PharmaChk device 
by using medicinal field samples of Coartem® and its generic versions collected from various 
healthcare facilities in Zimbabwe. We showed that the application of PharmaChk device as a 
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portable screening tool can provide rapid assessment of medicines quality for SF medicines. This 
analytical technology showed comparable results (maximum  5% deviation) to the gold standard 
method (HPLC). 
 
However, this device proved to have some limitations during its application in the research project 
in Zimbabwe and  certain challenges must  be addressed (28). The PharmaChk technique needs to 
be tested in more field surveys to prove its field feasibility. Moreover, the reference library needs 
to be developed similar to the libraries available in the handheld Raman and NIR spectrometers so 
that calibration with the reference substance is not required anymore. In addition, if the range of 
the International Pharmacopoeia for assay of tablets 90-110% of API content is considered and as 
an example the PharmaChk instrument assesses a content of 90% API content including systematic 
error of ±5%, there is a risk that the device evaluates the medicinal sample as good quality although 
it is substandard and leads to a false  negative result (type II error). Further research and 
development of this instrument to increase the device’s sensitivity is pivotal to achieve accurate 
differentiation between good quality and substandard medicinal products. For  now PharmaChk 
can describe the quantity of the API and the dissolution profile, thus in future it might also be 
possible to assess the presence of contaminants and known degradation products. This device will 
not be able to replace confirmatory testing with HPLC or MS as these technologies unequivocally 
confirm the substandard nature of medicinal products (206). In the future this instrument may 
triage samples for medicines’ quality confirmatory analysis and reduce time and analysis costs in 
developing countries .  
 
A thorough reflection of the current situation to identify SSMs reveals that analytical 
“…technologies alone will not solve the problem…” (26). The conduct of representative and 
generalizable studies in the field would be beneficial (52) adding to the concerted efforts of 
regulators, the pharmaceutical industry, and enforcement agencies to implement worldwide 
regulatory and general manufacturing standards. There is no established threshold for defining 
medicines as being substandard in terms of %API (6), DRs and impurities rate.  Moreover, there 
is a definite need for structured and standardized guidance on medicines quality and assessment of 
SSMs (332).  
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Both screening methods presented in this thesis may support various stakeholders to combat the 
problem of SSMs. The pharmacovigilance tool can be employed by MOHs, the pharmaceutical 
industry and NGOs whereas the PharmaChk device can also be applied by HCPs in hospitals and 
pharmacies, importers, drug inspectors, law enforcement officers, border officials and 
manufacturers. Both tools can be successfully used to triage suspected substandard or falsified 
medicine samples for further verification analysis. The triage process allows saving analysis costs 
and the testing of large quantities of medicine samples throughout the whole supply chain. 
Confirmatory analysis determines the type of substandard nature of the medicinal samples which 
can be either due to degradation, contamination or bioavailability issues. Based on the 
investigations made, sanctions and policies can be established in a shorter timeframe. These 
detection approaches are both easy to operate, cheap and quick methods to be implemented 
worldwide for detection and monitoring of quality of medicines which can be either based on 
WHO Medical product alerts (95) or for regular inspection of the pharmaceutical market. Both 
detection methods require a repository of reference samples or spectra to perform analysis of 
tablets by direct comparison (221).  
Based on the application of both detection tools in the research study in Zimbabwe, we constructed  
a roadmap (Figure 23) for the efficient assessment of quality of medicines in field surveys (11). 
This roadmap presents the effective combination of both presented detection methods. We 
incorporated the testing procedures of suspect SSFFC medicine samples recommended by WHO 
(206) together with the procedures used to investigate malarial drug quality in developing countries 
by CODFIN (11). It is notable that each of the steps mentioned below should be performed in 
accordance with WHO guidelines for sample collection and reporting (206) and the 
recommendations of the MEDQUARG checklist (11).   
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Figure 23 Suggested roadmap for field surveys on quality of medicines 
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Vigibase® other pharmacovigilance databases and/or registries could be employed (e.g. mobile 
app developed in WEB-RADR project). The WEB-RADR project which was launched in 2014, is 
based on a public-private partnership by Novartis and the MHRA (334) developed a mobile app 
for HCPs and the public to report suspected ADRs (335).  
 
After selecting the countries and trade names, field studies in developed and developing countries 
shall be conducted by using a suitable sample collection method. For all selected trade names, 
reference samples need to be provided by the manufacturers.  Every collected medicinal sample 
will be registered in a database and thereafter divided into three subsets. Subset 1 will be stored by 
NMRA (in case further investigation analysis is required). Subset 2 is used for qualitative and 
quantitative screening purpose. Qualitative screening analysis include visual inspection [following 
WHO Checklist for visual inspection of packaging (336)], CD3 analysis of the packaging and 
Raman and NIR spectrometry for evaluating the chemical composition of the API and the 
excipients. Qualitative screening tests include content evaluation in %API with the PharmaChk 
device. If subset 2 passes all screening tests, this indicates that the medicinal sample is of 
satisfactory quality. But if one of the analysis tests reveals different results compared to the 
reference product then this represents a suspected case and needs to be further investigated by 
confirmatory analysis. Verification testing includes qualitative and quantitative assessment of API 
and impurities in order to determine if there was a manufacturing problem. Moreover degradation 
analysis is required to reveal if the medicine sample was stored adequately. For conclusive 
evaluation of the substandard nature of subset 3, the bioavailability of the sample needs to be 
analyzed with the dissolution test.  
Overall, we approached the subject of SSMs holistically. The research started with 
pharmacovigilance, progressed on to analytical approaches to identify SSMs and the learnings 
were applied  in a field setting in Zimbabwe (Chapter 10). We also considered other domains to  
assess management of the problems associated with SSMs. These included monitoring of 
medicines quality based on AE reports, rising awareness on burden of SSMs, capacity building of 
the national laboratory in Zimbabwe including provision of training on qualitative and quantitative 
analysis of SF samples as well as building various relationships with academia, the pharmaceutical 
industry, analytical laboratories and the WHO to extend the current knowledge on detection of 
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SSMs.  
 
In addition to pharmaceutical industry and healthcare systems, quality evaluation and control are 
also featuring in food and aviation industries (337) from which a significant learnings can be 
leveraged for addressing the SSMs issues. Indeed, both domains are relevant, due to potential 
safety concerns and careful controls (338). Checklists (339) and full adherence to national and 
cross-border quality standards (340) characterize their processes. Amir Attaran, professor in the 
faculties of law and medicine at the University of Ottawa (341), who has done extensive research 
on the field of defective medicines, said in a recent interview concerning aviation quality 
regulations:  
 
“There are dozens of treaties on civil aviation, and every single country is following those. If not, 
they don`t fly” (337).  
 
In the food industry, traceability practices  are the norm and have been successfully maintained 
over periods of years (342). Since 2002, the European Union`s General Food law (Regulation 
178/2002, Article 18) requires compulsory traceability for food and feed operators (343).  
 
Compared to the food law, the EU Commission issued the EU Falsified Medicines Directive (EU 
FMD) only  in 2013 which includes serialization, verification and compliance reporting 
requirements (344). Notably “this legislation introduces track and trace regulations that enable 
harmonized, European-wide measures to rigorously control the safety and supply of medicines for 
human use” (344). All pharmaceutical manufacturers, parallel importers, wholesalers and 
pharmacies have to comply  from February 9, 2019 (344). According to the update on the 
implementation of the medicine traceability there are some drawbacks (345). Currently the setup 
of the repository systems which are essential to verify the authenticity of medicines is behind 
schedule. Moreover there are 17 pending contract agreements, issues with stakeholder integrations 
and lack of appropriate hospital budget plans covering the necessary equipment and resources 
costs for implementation of the new legislation in public hospitals (345).  
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Thus, in regard to medicine quality, we do not need to reinvent the wheel. But we do need to learn 
lessons, and learn them quickly, to apply effective measures to prevent this scourge from impacting 
healthcare systems across the world.  
 Future directions of the research projects described above 
Ongoing and future work towards addressing new detection approaches for identifying SSMs are 
outlined below: 
 
• We are currently looking at the implementation of an additional quantitative screening tool which 
can be used in field surveys by drug inspectors and law enforcement officials to rapidly assess 
whether medicines are of good quality, substandard or falsified (6).   
 
• A follow-up project is planned in Zimbabwe to extend on other disease areas including non-
communicative diseases as well as in other countries in Africa.   
 
• There is common interest with WHO Essential Medicines and Health Products (EMP) 
department (346) to understand which AEs reported in Vigibase® can be related to SSMs. We 
would like to assess if there are more preferred terms indicative of SSMs. 
14 Overall conclusion 
The aim of this research was to explore detection approaches for identifying SSMs. We described 
the effective approach of analyzing the pharmacovigilance database Vigibase® with 
disproportionality methodology to support the detection of SSMs. We showed that the application 
of PharmaChk device as a portable analytical screening tool can provide rapid assessment on 
evaluation of medicines quality for substandard and falsified medicines. The field study in 
Zimbabwe showed the successful implementation of the Coartem® assay on the PharmaChk device 
by using medicinal field samples of Coartem® and its generic versions collected from various 
private healthcare facilities. These detection approaches can be used by concerned stakeholders to 
fill the current gaps regarding detection of SSMs in the healthcare system. The pharmacovigilance 
detection approach can be employed by Ministries of Health, the pharmaceutical industry and the 
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NGOs whereas the PharmaChk instrument can moreover be applied by HCPs in hospitals and 
pharmacies, importers, drug inspectors, law enforcement officers and border officials. In addition 
we developed a roadmap that synthesizes both detection methods together with the procedures 
used to investigate medicines drug quality in field studies. 
My hope is that this research will stimulate further thoughts and potentially activity by various 
stakeholders to improve the current status, and to enhance research activities on SSMs. 
 
15 Publications 
The work detailed in Chapters 9 and 10 are currently under internal review for separate 
publications. The research project described in Chapter 12 was conditionally accepted for 
submission in Lancet Global Health journal.  
 
I would like to end my PhD thesis with the words of James Fitzgerald, Director of the Department 
of Health and Services: “Quality medicines are essential to provide quality health care. We cannot 
take for granted that all medicines meet international standards in quality, safety and efficacy. We 
must remain vigilant all times, and put in place the necessary safeguards to protect people within 
our health systems.” 
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16 Appendix 
Table 10 Annex table of the subset content analysis of 110 samples of artemether and 
lumefantrine as well as total impurities rate of lumefantrine  
Sample number Assay Artemether 
Assay 
Lumefantrine 
Degradation products 
for lumefantrine:  
Total impurities  
ZW_2017_001 99.70% 99.19% 0.05% 
ZW_2017_003 102.74% 99.43% <0.05% 
ZW_2017_005 102.04% 99.54% <0.05% 
ZW_2017_006 100.36% 100.05% <0.05% 
ZW_2017_007 96.34% 99.38% 0.16% 
ZW_2017_008 98.68% 99.70% 0.05% 
ZW_2017_009 100.08% 99.48% 0.10% 
ZW_2017_010 101.48% 99.83% <0.05% 
ZW_2017_012 102.64% 101.81% <0.05% 
ZW_2017_013 100.83% 101.08% <0.05% 
ZW_2017_014 101.68% 98.90% 0.05% 
ZW_2017_015 100.26% 100.90% 0.05% 
ZW_2017_016 99.48% 101.88% <0.05% 
ZW_2017_017 98.48% 98.20% 0.06% 
ZW_2017_018 96.49% 100.05% 0.06% 
ZW_2017_019 103.96% 98.23% <0.05% 
ZW_2017_020 97.88% 97.58% 0.05% 
ZW_2017_021 100.96% 98.15% 0.06% 
ZW_2017_022 98.12% 96.44% 0.06% 
ZW_2017_023 102.42% 100.53% <0.05% 
ZW_2017_024 101.62% 100.26% <0.05% 
ZW_2017_025 99.81% 97.54% 0.06% 
ZW_2017_028 100.86% 101.47% <0.05% 
ZW_2017_029 100.35% 100.02% 0.05% 
ZW_2017_031 101.96% 98.04% 0.05% 
ZW_2017_032 101.53% 101.41% <0.05% 
ZW_2017_033 102.42% 100.04% <0.05% 
ZW_2017_034 99.96% 102.70% <0.05% 
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Sample number Assay Artemether 
Assay 
Lumefantrine 
Degradation products 
for lumefantrine:  
Total impurities  
ZW_2017_035 102.09% 100.56% <0.05% 
ZW_2017_036 101.17% 99.61% <0.05% 
ZW_2017_037 100.82% 100.69% <0.05% 
ZW_2017_039 99.23% 99.54% <0.05% 
ZW_2017_040 101.61% 100.94% 0.05% 
ZW_2017_041 99.60% 101.64% <0.05% 
ZW_2017_042 100.62% 99.84% <0.05% 
ZW_2017_043 100.56% 100.31% <0.05% 
ZW_2017_044 102.14% 100.86% <0.05% 
ZW_2017_045 99.03% 101.40% <0.05% 
ZW_2017_047 100.71% 100.89% <0.05% 
ZW_2017_048 100.43% 99.84% <0.05% 
ZW_2017_051 101.24% 101.20% <0.05% 
ZW_2017_052 101.11% 99.40% <0.05% 
ZW_2017_055 101.63% 99.33% 0.05% 
ZW_2017_057 101.22% 99.29% <0.05% 
ZW_2017_058 103.12% 98.57% <0.05% 
ZW_2017_059 100.92% 98.94% 0.06% 
ZW_2017_060 100.12% 96.84% 0.06% 
ZW_2017_061 99.91% 100.46% 0.06% 
ZW_2017_062 102.46% 98.41% 0.05% 
ZW_2017_063 101.91% 95.34% 0.10% 
ZW_2017_064 102.52% 101.71% <0.05% 
ZW_2017_065 101.69% 98.61% 0.17% 
ZW_2017_066 103.19% 100.11% 0.06% 
ZW_2017_067 102.24% 102.13% 0.07% 
ZW_2017_068 105.14% 101.82% <0.05% 
ZW_2017_070 102.08% 97.21% <0.05% 
ZW_2017_072 103.19% 98.25% <0.05% 
ZW_2017_073 98.03% 101.59% 0.05% 
ZW_2017_074 102.29% 103.02% <0.05% 
ZW_2017_075 100.46% 99.30% 0.05% 
ZW_2017_076 106.86% 100.99% <0.05% 
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Sample number Assay Artemether 
Assay 
Lumefantrine 
Degradation products 
for lumefantrine:  
Total impurities  
ZW_2017_077 102.99% 101.46% <0.05% 
ZW_2017_078 102.65% 101.58% <0.05% 
ZW_2017_079 99.44% 100.21% <0.05% 
ZW_2017_081 101.82% 100.74% 0.05% 
ZW_2017_083 101.43% 100.81% <0.05% 
ZW_2017_085 103.29% 100.86% <0.05% 
ZW_2017_086 102.43% 101.23% <0.05% 
ZW_2017_087 100.40% 100.30% <0.05% 
ZW_2017_088 101.77% 101.35% <0.05% 
ZW_2017_089 97.12% 101.12% 0.05% 
ZW_2017_091 100.23% 101.44% <0.05% 
ZW_2017_092 100.90% 101.61% <0.05% 
ZW_2017_093 99.04% 98.66% 0.06% 
ZW_2017_094 101.47% 99.99% <0.05% 
ZW_2017_095 99.94% 100.39% <0.05% 
ZW_2017_096 99.51% 99.64% <0.05% 
ZW_2017_100 99.28% 101.13% <0.05% 
ZW_2017_101 101.84% 100.86% <0.05% 
ZW_2017_102 100.56% 100.79% <0.05% 
ZW_2017_103 103.26% 99.46% 0.06% 
ZW_2017_104 104.24% 101.29% <0.05% 
ZW_2017_105 103.63% 100.47% <0.05% 
ZW_2017_107 99.88% 101.22% 0.05% 
ZW_2017_108 102.26% 98.95% 0.05% 
ZW_2017_109 105.75% 99.65% <0.05% 
ZW_2017_110 105.27% 100.42% <0.05% 
ZW_2017_111 103.73% 100.33% 0.05% 
ZW_2017_113 104.40% 100.40% <0.05% 
ZW_2017_116 103.64% 100.00% <0.05% 
ZW_2017_118 100.97% 100.09% 0.06% 
ZW_2017_119 104.56% 100.60% <0.05% 
ZW_2017_120 103.83% 99.94% <0.05% 
ZW_2017_122 105.51% 101.92% <0.05% 
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Sample number Assay Artemether 
Assay 
Lumefantrine 
Degradation products 
for lumefantrine:  
Total impurities  
ZW_2017_123 104.19% 100.07% <0.05% 
ZW_2017_125 102.73% 100.74% <0.05% 
ZW_2017_127 97.56% 100.14% 0.16% 
ZW_2017_129 101.92% 99.43% <0.05% 
ZW_2017_130 105.78% 99.12% <0.05% 
ZW_2017_134 100.51% 95.90% 0.21% 
ZW_2017_137 105.25% 99.33% <0.05% 
ZW_2017_138 104.29% 100.12% <0.05% 
ZW_2017_141 105.01% 98.61% <0.05% 
ZW_2017_142 93.00% 100.27% 0.19% 
ZW_2017_143 102.57% 99.82% <0.05% 
ZW_2017_145 102.97% 100.11% <0.05% 
ZW_2017_146 102.19% 100.56% <0.05% 
ZW_2017_148 101.03% 98.56% 0.10% 
ZW_2017_149 100.82% 101.07% <0.05% 
ZW_2017_153 106.41% 99.67% <0.05% 
    
Mean 101.51% 100.03%  
 
Table 11 Artemether and lumefantrine dissolution rates of 30 samples at 1h, 3h and 45` 
Subset analysis DR Artemether 1h DR Artemether 3h DR Lumefantrine 45' 
ZW_2017_001 62% 86% 72% 
ZW_2017_007 94% 97% 95% 
ZW_2017_010 65% 87% 71% 
ZW_2017_013 76% 98% 77% 
ZW_2017_015 61% 85% 70% 
ZW_2017_019 74% 95% 78% 
ZW_2017_022 62% 86% 74% 
ZW_2017_031 82% 96% 80% 
ZW_2017_032 57% 87% 88% 
ZW_2017_038 71% 90% 95% 
ZW_2017_047 77% 98% 80% 
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Subset analysis DR Artemether 1h DR Artemether 3h DR Lumefantrine 45' 
ZW_2017_052 77% 96% 80% 
ZW_2017_081 84% 97% 74% 
ZW_2017_093 67% 90% 74% 
ZW_2017_097 73% 91% 92% 
ZW_2017_107 64% 86% 76% 
ZW_2017_117 72% 90% 96% 
ZW_2017_124 71% 89% 92% 
ZW_2017_125 74% 95% 79% 
ZW_2017_127 62% 83% 94% 
ZW_2017_128 71% 89% 93% 
ZW_2017_129 76% 95% 80% 
ZW_2017_130 75% 95% 77% 
ZW_2017_134 100% 100% 98% 
ZW_2017_137 78% 97% 79% 
ZW_2017_140 71% 90% 93% 
ZW_2017_141 75% 94% 76% 
ZW_2017_142 65% 85% 93% 
ZW_2017_143 79% 95% 75% 
ZW_2017_153 76% 95% 77% 
    
Mean 73,03% 91,9% 82,6% 
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